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Shelfer: Intergovernmental Federalism Disputes

INTERGOVERNMENTAL FEDERALISM
DISPUTES
Lochlan F. Shelfer*
Constitutional litigation is increasingly being waged
between governments, in both suits between a state and
the United States, and suits between two or more states.
The jurisdictionof the Federalcourts to hear such suits,
however, is disputed. The Supreme Court's cases are
famously difficult to reconcile, with some denying
jurisdiction and other seemingly identical cases
addressing the merits without discussing jurisdiction.
Some scholars have argued that intergovernmental
disputes over political jurisdiction historically are not
justiciableand that it is constitutionallyillegitimate for
the Court to hear them. Recently, some scholars have
argued that the Court should hear such cases, but have
assumed their historical illegitimacy and have instead
argued normatively that the realities of our modern
system weigh in favor of updated justiciability
standards.
This Article analyzes the constitutional history of
what it calls "Intergovernmentalfederalism disputes." It
argues that the Constitutiongrants federal courts power
to hear certain intergovernmental controversies
regarding the line dividing their respective regulatory
jurisdictions. This power, however, was not historically
a common-law or equity court power. In the colonial
system, it was a power exercised exclusively by the King's
Privy Council, and then by Congress in the
Confederation Period. Early drafts of the Constitution
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granted this power to the Senate, before ultimately
granting it to the Supreme Court. This Article argues
that it is thus historically legitimate for federal courts to
hear such controversies, so long as they adhere to the
historical model of claims that a governing entity has
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate a particularterritory,
person, activity, or object. This historical theory also
helps to explain the Supreme Court's previously
irreconcilablecases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intergovernmental controversies make up an increasingly
prominent share of constitutional litigation. In the last decade,
states have sued the United States to have executive orders1 and
federal statutes 2 declared unconstitutional. States have sued other
states to have laws declared unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause. 3 The United States, in turn, has sued states to have state
4
statutes declared preempted under the Supremacy Clause.
And yet, such suits are jurisdictionally anomalous. They often
lack traditional justiciability requirements, such as standing, or
violate other justiciability doctrines such as political question, the
prohibition against advisory opinions, or the general requirements
that there be a cause of action and a "case or controversy" of the
5
kind traditionally cognized by a common-law or equity court.
Instead, one governing entity simply asks the court to declare
another government's act unconstitutional. Accordingly, although
such suits have been brought periodically over the past centuries,
1 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (challenging an executive
order restricting refugee and alien admissions); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.)
(challenging an executive order restricting refugee and alien admissions), vacated as moot,
138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (challenging the
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program), aff'd
by equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam); Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244
(5th Cir. 2015) (challenging the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program); see also
Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613, pt. II (2015)
(describing modern state legal resistance to federal legislation and actions).
2 See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (challenging
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's individual mandate); Florida ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (challenging the Affordable Care Act's Medicare
expansion), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519 (2012); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Conn.
2005) (challenging federal fishery statutes on Tenth Amendment grounds).
See, e.g., Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (dismissing a motion for leave to
file a bill of complaint under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking to have
Colorado's legalization of marijuana declared preempted and thus unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause); cf. Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (suing New York
officers to have a New York statute declared unconstitutional).
4 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (challenging Arizona immigration
law); United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (challenging Alabama
immigration law), affd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.
2012).
5 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (holding that Article III does not
allow courts to hear a suit where the parties were simply asking the court to determine the
constitutionality of a statute).
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the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate when or why such
suits are cognizable, in some cases summarily denying
governments' motions to file a bill in the Court's original
7
jurisdiction,6 in some cases denying that the Court has jurisdiction,
and in other similar cases addressing the merits without
considering justiciability at all.8 Commentators have found these
cases "hard to reconcile." 9
Historically, common-law, equity, and admiralty courts were not
able to hear political controversies about which government had
regulatory authority over a particular object. 10 Indeed, scholars
6 See generally, e.g., Nebraska,135 S. Ct. 1034; Louisiana v. Bryson, 565 U.S. 1258 (2012);
Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006); Michigan v. Meese, 479 U.S. 1078 (1987); Indiana v.
United States, 471 U.S. 1123 (1985); Idaho v. Vance, 434 U.S. 1031 (1978); Georgia v. Nixon,
414 U.S. 810 (1973); Alabama v. Connally, 404 U.S. 933 (1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886 (1970).
7 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 341 (1926) (denying jurisdiction to
adjudicate a case between a State and the United States Attorney General, where New Jersey
sough to enjoin enforcement of the Federal Water Power Act); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 480 (1923) (holding that Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case brought by
Massachusetts against the Secretary of the Treasury challenging the constitutionality of the
Maternity Act); Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Texas v. ICC), 258 U.S. 158, 162
(1922) (denying jurisdiction to hear Texas' constitutional challenge to certain provisions of
the Transportation Act of 1920); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867) (denying
jurisdiction to hear a case brought by Georgia against the Secretary of War to enjoin
enforcement of the Reconstruction Act); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20
(1831) (denying jurisdiction in a case brought by the Cherokee Nation against Georgia to
enjoin state laws that deprived its members of certain rights).
8 See generally, e.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. 387; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367
(1984); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S.
228 (1925); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Each case cited in this footnote is
discussed in detail in Part IV of this Article.
9 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 283 (7th ed. 2015).
10 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 753 (1838) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court cannot hear mere "[c]ontests for rights of sovereignty and
jurisdiction between states"); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20 (holding that such a case
"savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the
judicial department"); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 4 n.3 (1799) (stating that
there must be "a substantial right of soil, not a mere political jurisdiction, to be protected and
enforced" for the Court to exercise jurisdiction); Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. (1793)
30 Eng. Rep. 521, 523; 2 Ves. Jun. 56, 60 (holding that treaties into which the East India
Company, acting as an independent state under charter, entered were "not subject to private,
municipal jurisdiction"); Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1134; 1 Ves. Sen.
444, 447 (denying original jurisdiction regarding the question of "the original right of the
[territorial] boundaries").
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have argued that such intergovernmental controversies cannot
legitimately be heard in federal courts lest a "mockery" be made "of
the constitutional requirement of case or controversy" and the Court
be turned into the "sort of council of revision rejected by the
framers."1 1
This confusion in the doctrine has led to several casualties. For
example, courts will only haphazardly address justiciability of
particular intergovernmental disputes, resulting in similar cases
12
with opposite outcomes.
In the last few years, a number of scholars have argued that
federal courts should be able to hear at least some
intergovernmental controversies; these scholars, however, have
tended to assert normative and functional arguments rather than
resolving the historical and constitutional difficulties of Article III
courts hearing intergovernmental controversies over political
authority. 13 Indeed, "[h]istorical scholarship has not played an
11Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89-90; see Stephen
I. Vladeck, States'Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 848 (2012) (agreeing
with Professor Bickel that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear mere assertions that
a congressional statute is unconstitutional unless it "operates on the states qua states");
Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, pt. II.C (2012)
(arguing that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear Virginia's challenge to the
Affordable Care Act's individual mandate); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State
Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392-93, 393 n.9, 400 (1995) (arguing that "it seems to follow
from Article III's structure, wording, and early implementation" that states can assert only
"common-law actions" and not suits premised merely on "sovereign interests"); Ann
Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 211 (2014)
(updating argument in light of intervening cases and scholarship); see also PAUL M. BATOR
ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 297 (3d ed.

1988) ("Justice O'Connor's constitutional analysis [in South Carolinav. Regan] works only on
the assumption that South Carolina has a constitutional right as such to enforce its Tenth
Amendment 'rights' by judicial action. Does the Tenth Amendment guarantee the states such
an action? Should Article III itself be deemed to give the states such a cause of action?").
12 Compare Arizona, 567 U.S. at 393 (entertaining suit by the United States to have state
statute declared preempted without addressing justiciability), and United States v. Alabama,
813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1295-93 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (same), affd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed
in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), with Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d
253, 266 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting for lack of standing Virginia's suit to have the Affordable
Care Act's individual mandate declared unconstitutional for exceeding Congress's
enumerated powers and regulating in an exclusively state-controlled subject-matter domain).
13 See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18-20, 7284 (2014) (arguing that, given the modern interaction between states and the United States,
federal courts should recognize an implied right of action of governing entities to bring
sovereignty disputes, even if courts would not have historically heard such controversies);
Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 855-
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important role in defining the scope of [the Supreme Court's]
14
original jurisdiction."
This Article aims to fill that gap by offering an historical analysis
of the constitutional basis for these intergovernmental
jurisdictional disputes. It argues that, while Article III courts do
not have general jurisdiction over any constitutional controversy
between governing entities, the history demonstrates that the
Constitution does give Article III courts jurisdiction over a
narrowly-defined subset of cases: state-party intergovernmental
disputes where individual states or the United States ask a federal
court to draw the lines that separate governing entities' respective
authority to regulate particular objects. These intergovernmental
disputes include contests over physical domains, as in territorial
boundary disputes, as well as contests over conceptual domains, as
in subject-matter boundary disputes. But in either case, they must
assert competing claims of exclusive regulatory power over a
particular object. Such cases may be termed "intergovernmental
federalism disputes."
In territorial boundary disputes, states or the United States ask
the Supreme Court to determine which governing entity has
exclusive regulatory authority over a particular physical area. For
56 (2016) (arguing on a precedential and normative basis that states have standing to assert
their sovereign interests in enforcing their regulatory laws, but declining to consider the
meaning of Article I11); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1514 (2013) (arguing in favor of only institutional, and not individual, standing to
pursue structural constitutional claims); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge
Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637, 641 (2016)
(arguing that antiquated notions of state standing should not be applicable today, given the
drastic increase in federal regulation and the modern system of dual sovereignty and
cooperative federalism, and that therefore "states should have general 'governance' standing
to challenge federal power and action when the federal law at issue contemplates an
implementation role for state governments"); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing
Sovereign State Standing,97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2061-64 (2011) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court used to reject sovereign state standing, but arguing that the more recent cases, coupled
with changed circumstances in federal-state interaction in the modern world, argue in favor
of allowing states to assert sovereignty claims in federal courts); see also Henry P. Monaghan,
ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1367-68 (1973) (arguing
that, because in federalism cases "the real contestants were Congress and the states," courts
should allow such intergovernmental suits); cf. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II et al., State
Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, but Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 93, 111 (2012)
(elaborating on the standing arguments from Virginia's Fourth Circuit brief in the case
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011)).
14 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4042 (3d ed. 2004).
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instance, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court, in
its original jurisdiction, was asked to determine precisely where the
boundary separating the two states was located. 15 In subject-matter
boundary disputes, states or the United States ask the Supreme
Court to determine which governing entity has exclusive regulatory
authority over a particular activity, person, or thing. For instance,
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, South Carolina asked the
Supreme Court, in its original jurisdiction, to determine whether
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 invaded the states' exclusive right to
16
regulate voter qualifications.
Before the Revolution, this authority was vested in the royal
Privy Council.1 7 The Privy Council would hear grievances brought
by one colony against another colony or against the crownsupported governor. Notably, these cases could not be heard in a
Nevertheless, the
traditional common-law or equity court.18
proceedings resembled a legal action, with each side filing briefs and
then engaging in an oral argument.1 9 The disputes that were heard
in this fashion involved colonies asserting exclusive governing
rights that they claimed had been infringed by the act of another
governing entity. 20 Thus, colonies would bring petitions to the Privy
Council, asking for resolution of territorial boundary disputes to the
Privy Council, with each colony asserting exclusive governing
jurisdiction over a particular tract of land. 21 Colonies would also
petition the Privy Council to resolve inter-colonial disputes
regarding which one had exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over a
particular activity, such as trade in the New York Bay or trade with
certain American Indian tribes. 22 Finally, colonial assemblies
would petition the Privy Council to resolve a controversy it had with
its royal governor, alleging that the governor had overstepped his
bounds and infringed upon the assembly's exclusive regulatory

15 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 657 (1838).
16 383 U.S. 301, 301 (1966), abrogatedby Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
17 See infra note 78.
18 See infra note 78.

19 See infra notes 140, 177 and accompanying text (describing examples of such procedure).
20 See infra Part III.A.2.
21 See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text (describing the procedure and providing
examples).
22 See infra notes 119-121, 135-138 and accompanying text.
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authority. 23 These latter suits were, in effect, controversies over the
boundaries dividing local colonial authority from imperial
authority-not unlike modern vertical federalism suits. In the
1760s and 1770s, the colonies adapted this latter form of petition,
sending petitions and remonstrances to the King that asked for a
declaration of the colonies' exclusive control over internal
24
taxation.
over
this special jurisdiction
After
the Revolution,
intergovernmental disputes was transferred to the Confederation
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 25 Again, although the
procedures used did resemble judicial proceedings, traditional
Only one
this jurisdiction. 26
did not exercise
courts
intergovernmental controversy was resolved in this manner during
the Confederation's short existence, a territorial boundary dispute
between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, 27 although the jurisdiction
28
was broader than territorial boundary disputes alone.
Beginning with the earliest plans for the Constitution, the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention in the summer of 1787 all
assumed that the federal government would possess jurisdiction
controversies just as the
over those intergovernmental
Confederation Congress did. 29 As this special jurisdiction had
always existed outside the common-law and equity court system,
the early drafts of the Constitution assigned the power to hear
intergovernmental federalism disputes to the Senate. 30 Near the
end of the convention, however, the delegates transferred the
authority to hear these intergovernmental federalism disputes from
the Senate to the Supreme Court. 31 Thus, federal courts possess a
unique jurisdiction that exists in addition to its jurisdiction over
traditional common-law, equity, and admiralty cases: it also
possesses the jurisdiction over intergovernmental disputes once

23 See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text (describing the petitions to the King in
Council which sought to resolve the Governor Phips controversy in Rhode Island).
24 See infra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 221-227 and accompanying text (describing the procedure).
27 See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
28 See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 236.
30 See infra notes 245-250 and accompanying text.
31 See infra note 268.
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exercised by the Privy Council and then by the Confederation
Congress.
This historical analysis suggests that it is not illegitimate for
federal courts to hear intergovernmental federalism disputes so
long as the disputes conform to the structure of their antecedent;
i.e., a contest between two states, or a state and the United States,
concerning which governing entity possesses the exclusive political
authority over particular territory, people, things, or activities.
Under this unique jurisdiction, courts may hear only the question
of which governing entity possesses exclusive power to regulate a
particular domain. The Court's intergovernmental cases that once
seemed contradictory may be reconciled under this understanding
of the source and contours of the federal courts' jurisdictional basis.
Part II of this Article sets forth the current judicial and scholarly
disagreements over federal jurisdiction to hear intergovernmental
controversies. Part III presents the history of the Constitution's
grant of jurisdiction over intergovernmental disputes, tracing it
from the Privy Council through the Confederation Congress to the
Constitution. This Part deduces from this historical background the
requirement that, to qualify for this exceptional jurisdiction, an
intergovernmental suit must present competing claims to exclusive
regulatory control over a particular object. Part IV analyzes
Supreme Court doctrine and concludes that the Court's cases
regarding intergovernmental suits, although they initially appear
contradictory, can be reconciled under this historical metric.

II. THE JURISDICTIONAL DIFFICULTY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
FEDERALISM DISPUTES

Do federal courts have the authority to hear disputes between
governmental entities over which one has the authority to regulate
a particular domain, and, if so, where do the courts get that
authority?
Article III describes two types of disputes over which federal
courts have jurisdiction: "cases" and "controversies." First, the
federal judicial power extends to "all Cases, in Law and Equity"
arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties, as well as
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to "all Cases affecting" ambassadors and foreign ministers, and also
32
to "all" admiralty and maritime cases.
Second, Article III extends the federal judicial power to a series
of "controversies," all of which are defined by party and none of
which is limited, as with federal question cases, to those "in Law
and Equity" or "of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The
controversies over which federal courts have jurisdiction include
"Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party" and
"Controversies between two or more States." 33
Thus, textually, although "Cases" are limited to those "in Law
and Equity," "Controversies" are not so limited. 34 Traditionally,
federal courts have exercised jurisdiction over three types of stateparty controversies.
The first comprises those suits premised on a government's
"proprietary" interests, in which the governing entity has the same
35
standing as an individual to protect its property or contract rights.
Thus, one government might bring an action to recover bonds issued
38
37
by another government, 36 or to enforce a contract or compact.
These cases have not raised justiciability difficulties, as they
resemble ordinary common-law and equity suits that courts have
always entertained.

32

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

33 Id.
34 See Part III.D for further discussion of the scholarly debate into the differences, if any,

between a "case" and a "controversy."
35 See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 123 U.S. 32 (1887) (involving a suit by Louisiana
against the United States in the Court of Claims to recover funds).
36 See, e.g., South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (finding jurisdiction
in a suit between two states for the recovery of payment on a bond).
37 See, e.g., Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 169 (1930) (hearing a case between two
states regarding a contract for the construction of a bridge); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246
U.S. 565, 589 (1918) (exercising jurisdiction in a contractual dispute between two states);
United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379, 396 (1903) (exercising jurisdiction to hear a
complaint by the United States seeking to compel Michigan to account for a funding surplus);
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211, 216 (1890) (hearing an action brought by the
United States against a state regarding interest payable on certain bonds).
38 See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 334 (2010) (hearing a case brought
by several states against North Carolina, alleging violations of the Southeast Interstate LowLevel Radioactive Waste Management Compact); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 562
(1983) (exercising jurisdiction over a complaint filed by Texas, alleging that New Mexico had
breached the Pecos River Compact); Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 117-19 (1972) (hearing
a suit brought by Nebraska against Iowa, alleging that Iowa had breached the Iowa-Nebraska
Boundary Compact of 1943).
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controversies
intergovernmental
type
of
The
second
comprehends parens patriae or "quasi-sovereign" suits, in which a
state or the United States stands as the representative of all of its
citizens to assert an interest shared by its entire population. The
classic example is a suit by one government against another to
enjoin a nuisance that spills over the boundaries from one
jurisdiction to the other.3 9 Other parens patriae suits involve one
governing entity arguing that another government's act imposes
negative externalities on the former's citizens, 40 or is otherwise a
protectionist law that imposes negative economic externalities on
41
neighboring populations.
Because both government proprietary suits and parens patriae
suits conform to traditional causes of action, neither raises the
jurisdictional difficulties inherent in the third type of
intergovernmental controversies, and the one on which this Article
focuses: suits in which governing entities disagree over which one
has jurisdiction to regulate and govern a particular territory,
people, thing, or activity. The paradigmatic example is a territorial
boundary controversy, where each governing entity claims exclusive
Similar
jurisdictional control over a particular territory. 42

39 See, e.g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 298 (1921) (involving a suit by New
York to enjoin New Jersey from dumping sewage in New York Bay); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 208 (1901) (involving a complaint by Missouri that Illinois polluted the Mississippi
River).
40 Nebraska and Oklahoma's recently dismissed motion to file a bill in the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's legalization of marijuana is best understood as a
parenspatriaesuit to enjoin a nuisance. Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016).
41 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 440 (1992) (challenging an Oklahoma
statute requiring Oklahoma utilities to use at least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal, whereas
Oklahoma utilities had previously used almost 100% Wyoming-mined coal); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 555 (1923) (challenging a West Virginia statute requiring
producers of natural gas to give preference to West Virginia consumers).
42 See, e.g., Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96, 97 (1984) (disputing the boundary
established by the Mississippi River); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125, 126 (1980)
(disputing the boundary between California and Nevada); Ohio v. Kentucky, 444 U.S. 335,
335-36 (1980) (disputing whether the boundary between Ohio and Kentucky is either the
current Ohio River low-water mark or the low-water mark in 1792); United States v. Texas,
143 U.S. 621, 630-31 (1892) (determining whether certain land is owned by Texas); Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 714 (1838) (disputing the boundary between
Rhode Island and Massachusetts).
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controversies arise over which entity has exclusive governing
43
control over submerged seabed.
The Supreme Court has recognized that such intergovernmental
44
controversies are not limited to territorial boundary disputes.
Other intergovernmental controversies concern the extent to which
upstream states may control interstate rivers by diverting them. In
these controversies, the downstream state sues, claiming that,
although the upstream state asserts exclusive control over the
stream, the state does not in fact have exclusive jurisdiction, and
instead both states have concurrent regulatory authority over the
45
waters.
The Supreme Court has also exercised jurisdiction over
intergovernmental controversies regarding more incorporeal
regulatory objects. For instance, it has heard disputes concerning
which governing entity has exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over
local state elections, 46 migratory birds, 47 highways in national
50
parks, 48 immigration, 49 and the taxing of state bonds.
These cases contain little consideration of the Court's
jurisdiction, and there has been little rigor in the cases in explaining
43 See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504, 506 (1985) (determining whether the
United States had exclusive rights to the seabed and subsoil underlying certain Atlantic
coastline); United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 33 (1978) (determining whether the
United States or California has dominion over certain seabed off south California); United
States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531, 532 (1975) (disputing the "boundary of submerged lands" over
which Florida has rights to the natural resources); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 51617 (1975) (disputing federal claims to dominion over the seabed underlying certain Atlantic
coastline).
44 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 80 (1907) (upholding jurisdiction when the "suit
involves no question of boundary or of the limits of territorial jurisdiction. Other and
incorporeal rights are claimed by the respective litigants.").
45 See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902) (complaining that Colorado
diverted the Arkansas River).
46 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (challenging the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966) (challenging
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965), abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013).
47 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-31 (1920) (challenging the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act of 1918, and certain regulations made pursuant to the statute).
48 See, e.g., Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 229-30 (1925) (challenging a regulation that
prohibits access to the Rocky Mountain National Park to "automobiles for hire").
49 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 392-93 (2012) (determining whether
federal law preempts Arizona immigration laws).
50 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 370-72 (1984) (challenging a federal
tax on state bonds).
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the basis for federal courts' jurisdiction over intergovernmental
federalism disputes. 51 In Maryland v. Louisiana, for instance, the
Court suggested that a case should "sufficiently implicate the
unique concerns of federalism forming the basis of our original
jurisdiction" before the Court exercises jurisdiction over it.52 Justice
Rehnquist went further, opining in dissent that he "would require
that the State's claim involve some tangible relation to the State's
53
sovereign interests" before the Court exercises jurisdiction.
Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, gave any
justification for this conclusion.
The Court has also recognized that it possesses a grant of
jurisdiction lying outside the traditional form of disputes, noting
that the Constitution made some things "justiciable which were not
known as such at the common law; such, for example, as
controversies between States as to boundary lines, and other
questions admitting of judicial solution." 54 It has recognized that
the Constitution "establish[ed]" a "new branch of jurisdiction" that
was quite unlike the sort of jurisdiction traditionally exercised by
courts. 55 But, again, these declarations were little more than ipse
dixit.
51 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (finding that a defendant has
standing to challenge his conviction as violating the Tenth Amendment, stating that "[tihe
limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the
States"; thus suggesting a fortiori that states have standing to bring Tenth Amendment
challenges (emphasis added)); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982) (identifying in dicta two interests of governing entities over which it could exercise
jurisdiction: "[f]irst, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
relevant jurisdiction-this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code ... ; second,
the demand for recognition from other sovereigns-most frequently this involves the
maintenance and recognition of borders. The former is regularly at issue in constitutional
litigation. The latter is also a frequent subject of litigation, particularly in this Court.").
52 451 U.S. 725, 743 (1981).
("[The Court's] original
53 Id.
at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id.
jurisdiction... should be limited to complaints by States qua States. This would include the
prototypical original action, boundary disputes, and the familiar cases involving disputes over
water rights. In such cases, the State seeks to vindicate its rights as a State, a political
entity.").
54 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890); see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 657, 743 (1838) ("All the states have transferred the decision of their controversies
to this Court; each had a right to demand of it the exercise of the power which they had made
judicial by the confederation of 1781 and 1788; that we should do that which neither states
nor congress could do, settle the controversies between them.").
55 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900); see Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128
(1987) ("By ratifying the Constitution, the States gave this Court complete judicial power to
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In the intergovernmental controversies where the Court has
considered jurisdiction, it has concluded that it cannot hear certain
disputes, even though they seem indistinguishable from those over
which it exercised jurisdiction. For instance, the Court held that it
does not have jurisdiction to hear intergovernmental disputes
56
regarding Congress's authority to enact the Reconstruction Acts,
the Maternity Act of 1921, 57 the Transportation Act of 1920,58 and
the Federal Water Power Act. 59 In concluding that federal courts
lack the jurisdiction to hear such incorporeal intergovernmental
suits, the Supreme Court has stated that they cannot cognize claims
that "call for the judgment of the court upon political questions, and,
upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a political
character." 60 Such a case "[o]bviously... does not present a case or
controversy within the range of the judicial power as defined by the
Constitution," 61 and "[p]lainly... do[es] not suffice as a basis for
invoking an exercise of judicial power." 62 Federal courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has stated, when they are
"called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not
rights of dominion over physical domain, not quasi-sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of political
63
power, of sovereignty, of government."
More recently, the Court, acting in its original jurisdiction, has
summarily dismissed bills of complaint from states seeking a
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372 (1923)
adjudicate disputes among them ....");
("The jurisdiction and procedure of this Court in controversies between States of the Union
differ from those which it pursues in suits between private parties."); Virginia v. West
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 596 (1918) (referring to this "exceptional judicial power"); Florida v.
Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854) ("[A] question of boundary between States is in its
nature, a political question ....But under our government, a boundary between two States
may become a judicial question, to be decided by this court."); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 560 (1851) ("On a question of disputed boundary
between two States, although the inquiry of the court is limited to the establishment of a
common line, yet the exercise of sovereign authority, over more or less territory, may depend
upon the decision. This gives great dignity and importance to such a controversy, and renders
necessary a broader view, than on a question as to the mere right of property.").
66 Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867).
51 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923).
58 Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922).
59 New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 341 (1926).
60 Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77.
61 Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. at 162.
62 Sargent, 269 U.S. at 337.
63 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85 (1923).
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declaration that a particular statute or governmental action is
unconstitutional, such as those challenging the Vietnam War, 64 the
Panama Canal treaties of 1977, 65 presidential withholding of funds
that Congress provided to states, 6 6 a congressional statute
prohibiting intercepted communications from being introduced into
evidence in a state trial, 67 taxation exemptions for religious
organizations,6 the House of Representatives' refusal to seat a
particular candidate, 69 the Medicare Part D Clawback, 70 and the
71
counting of undocumented immigrants in the national census.
In the very first dispute between two states, 72 the Court even
struggled in determining whether it had jurisdiction over an
intergovernmental territorial boundary dispute, though today such
disputes seem paradigmatic, 73 and ultimately declined to decide the
issue. 74 In 1838, in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,the Court finally
determined its jurisdiction to hear such a controversy, 75 but only

Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
Idaho v. Vance, 434 U.S. 1031 (1978).
66 Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973).
67 Michigan v. Meese, 479 U.S. 1078 (1987).
68 Alabama v. Connally, 404 U.S. 933 (1971).
69 Indiana v. United States, 471 U.S. 1123 (1985).
70 Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006).
71 Louisiana v. Bryson, 565 U.S. 1258 (2012).
72 New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799); see Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208,
224 (1901) ("The case of New York v. Connecticut,in 1799, was the first instance of an exercise
by the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction in a controversy between two States.").
73 New York, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 4 (stating that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue an
injunction unless the state averred "a right of soil," in other words a common law property
interest in the land, as opposed to "a mere political jurisdiction"); see Fowler v. Lindsay, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 414 (1799) (Paterson, J.) ("How far a suit may, with effect, be instituted in
this Court to decide the right of jurisdiction between two States, abstractedly from the right
of soil, it is not necessary to determine. The question is a great one; but not before us."). But
see id. at 413 (Washington, J.) (stating that the Court would be able to afford an equitable
remedy for violations of even "such an incorporeal right as that of sovereignty and
64
65

jurisdiction").

See generally 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 178-92 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2007) (discussing the Fowler and
New York cases).
74 New York, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 3.
75 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721, 728 (1838) ("[T]hough the constitution does not, in terms,
extend the judicial power to all controversies between two or more states, yet it in terms
excludes none, whatever may be their nature or subject," and the Constitution "could not have
been intended to give to the judicial power a less extended jurisdiction ... than the articles
of confederation").
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over Chief Justice Taney's dissent,7 6 as well as Daniel Webster's
77
argument to the contrary.
The Supreme Court had reason to doubt whether it could exercise
jurisdiction over such intergovernmental federalism disputes. In
the colonial period, common-law and equity courts held that they
did not have the power to entertain a controversy between two
provinces concerning the precise location of the dividing line
separating the two powers, because only the King in Council could
decide such matters, 78 although there was limited equity power to

76 Id. at 752 (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Court can hear a controversy
regarding the boundaries of states only "where the suit is brought to try a right of property
in the soil, or any other right which is properly the subject of judicial cognizance and decision,"
and the Court's judicial power "extend[s] to those subjects, only, which are judicial in their
character; and not to those which are political").
77 Id. at 669, 677, 685 (arguing for Massachusetts that the Supreme Court did not have
jurisdiction over the suit because it "asserts the claim of Rhode Island to jurisdiction and
sovereignty over a portion of territory," but "makes no claim to any right of soil," and "[t]he
common law of England takes no jurisdiction over the actions of sovereign states; nor is there
any power in chancery to hold jurisdiction over a sovereign, without his consent").
78 See Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. (1793) 30 Eng. Rep. 521, 523; 2 Ves. Jun. 56,
60 (holding that "[the] case [is one] of mutual treaty between persons acting in that instance
as states independent of each other; and the circumstance, that the East India Company are
mere subjects with relation to this country, has nothing to do with that. That treaty was
entered into with them, not as subjects, but as a neighbouring independent state, and is the
same, as if it was a treaty between two sovereigns; and consequently is not a subject of
private, municipal, jurisdiction.") (italics omitted)); Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co.
(1791) 30 Eng. Rep. 391, 398; 1 Ves. Jun. 371, 384-85 (arguing that only the subject can sue
by petition and, upon a dispute between boundaries, the court could compel action as it did
in Penn v. Lord Baltimore); Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 27 Eng. Rep. 1132, 1134; 1 Ves.
Sen. 444, 446-47 ("It is certain, that the original jurisdiction in cases of this kind relating to
boundaries between provinces, the dominion, and proprietary government, is in the King and
council .
Similarly, such disputes "often aris[e] between the crown and one LordProprietor of a province in America," and in those cases too "the King is to judge, though he
might be a party .... This court therefore has no original jurisdiction on the direct question
of the original right of the boundaries." (italics omitted)); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *231 ("Whenever... a question arises between two provinces in America, or
elsewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like, the king in his council
exercises originaljurisdiction therein, upon the principles of fe[u]dal sovereignty."); A STATE
OF THE RIGHT OF THE COLONY OF NEW-YORK WITH RESPECT TO IT'S EASTERN BOUNDARY ON

CONNECTICUT RIVER 19 (1773) ("In every Question of Boundary between two Colonies, the
King, in Privy Council, exercises original Jurisdiction, on the Principles of Fe[u]dal
Sovereignty. There can be no other Tribunal.").
For instance, crown Solicitor General Clement Wearg and King's council John Willes
opined in 1724 that inter-colonial boundary disputes were not cognizable by courts and could
be heard only by the King in Council. JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL
FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 420 n.8 (1950).
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interpret and enforce a contract between two colonial proprietors
79
that determined the territorial boundary.
Thus, the Supreme Court's precedents reflect a deep
inconsistency regarding which intergovernmental disputes it may
hear and whether its jurisdiction is historically legitimate.
A similar division exists in the scholarly world, with several
commentators arguing that Article III courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear a controversy between states or between a state
and the United States over disputed regulatory authority. Professor
Alexander Bickel, for instance, assailed the Supreme Court's
exercise of this sort of jurisdiction in cases such as South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,80 characterizing it as illegitimate. Bickel argued that
"the nature of the federal union, the power and function of Congress
and the President, and the power and function of the judiciary all
would be radically altered if states could come into the original
jurisdiction at will to litigate the constitutional validity of national
law applicable within their territories."8 1 It does not "suffice to
invoke judicial action," Bickel argued, when a government asserts
"nothing more than her interest in the execution of her own laws"
and in having other governments "[enforce] only constitutional
laws."82 If the Court heard such cases, it "would make a mockery,
moreover, of the constitutional requirement of case or controversy,"
and the Court would be turned into the "sort of council of revision
83
rejected by the framers."
79 See Penn, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1133-34; 1 Ves. Sen. at 445-46.
80 383 U.S. 301, 302, 308 (1966) (exercising jurisdiction over a request by South Carolina
that the Court declare the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional as exceeding Congress's
enumerated powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, thereby intruding onto the
exclusive regulatory province of the states, and upholding the Act as constitutional),
abrogated by Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
8' Bickel, supra note 11, at 88-89.
82 Id. at 88.
83 Id. at 89-90; see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 441 ("Government action
typically could be tested only in cases involving a completed or imminent physical trespass
against person or property. This scheme gave meaning to the Framers' rejection of a Council
of Revision because it insisted on a traditional injury before declaring statutes
unconstitutional." (footnote omitted)).
Stephen Vladeck, relatedly, has argued that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear
intergovernmental federalism disputes extends only to those "cases in which no private party
would otherwise be able to maintain the same lawsuit," or only those cases where "the state
is suing to enforce its federal interests." Vladeck, supra note 11, at 848-50 (emphasis
omitted) (agreeing with Bickel that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear mere
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Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have agreed
that, historically, federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear
governing-interest claims by states. They argue that Article III
courts properly have jurisdiction over only those state-party cases
that are premised on the common law, and that "the common law
was not generally thought to be an appropriate vehicle to vindicate
interests in 'sovereignty,' as opposed to proprietary or contractual
rights."8 4 Historically, "states could not (in federal court) ordinarily
litigate against the federal government or other states conflicting
claims to regulate."8 5 Woolhandler and Collins argue that the
Constitution moved to a system in which only "common-law actions"
were cognizable.8 6 The authors acknowledge that this "limitation is
not obvious," but argue that "it seems to follow from Article III's
structure, wording, and early implementation."8
Others have
agreed,88 and even the Hart and Wechsler casebook at one time
89
questioned whether such suits are cognizable.
Other scholars, meanwhile, have argued that, in our modern
political system, states should be able to assert their sovereignty
interests in Article III courts. These scholars' analyses, however,
focus on the normative and policy merits of courts' hearing such
suits, without focusing on how federal courts acquired such
anomalous jurisdiction.9 0

assertions that a congressional statute is unconstitutional unless it "operates on the states
qua states").
84 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 410 (footnote omitted); see also Woolhandler,
supra note 11, at 209, 211 (updating the prior article in light of intervening cases and
commentary).
85 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 393.
86 Id. at 400; see id. at 406 ("[Iln the typical case, a state's ability to bring an original suit
in the Supreme Court depended on its ability to plead a traditional common-law case,
including the kind of injury that would give a private party a right of action.").
87 Id. at 400.
38 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 11, at 67-72 (arguing that federal courts did not have
jurisdiction to hear Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius).
89 BATOR ET AL., supra note 11, at 297 ("Justice O'Connor's constitutional analysis [in
South Carolina v. Regan] works only on the assumption that South Carolina has a
constitutional right as such to enforce its Tenth Amendment 'rights' by judicial action. Does
the Tenth Amendment guarantee the states such an action? Should Article III itself be
deemed to give the states such a cause of action?" (emphasis omitted)).
90 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 13, at 1443 (arguing in favor of only institutional, and not
individual, standing to pursue structural constitutional claims); Timothy Sandefur, State
Standing to Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action: The Health Care Cases and Beyond, 23 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 311, 327 (2012) ("[W]here the federal government exercises only those
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Professor Seth Davis, for instance, has assumed that such
intergovernmental federalism disputes traditionally were not
justiciable. 91 Nevertheless, he has argued that, as a normative
matter, the realities of our modern government mean that states
and the United States should be able to litigate structural
92
federalism disputes against each other.
Professor Tara Leigh Grove recently argued that states are
entitled to "special solicitude" in standing analysis only when they
seek to enforce or defend the enforceability of state laws, or at least
those state laws that are regulatory, as opposed to merely
declaratory, 93 but acknowledged that the Article was not attempting
to describe "the original meaning of Article III" because "it is hard
to make definitive claims about the original meaning of Article III
in the context of state standing."94 Professor Shannon Roesler has
similarly argued that states have standing "to challenge federal
laws and actions" when "the federal law at issue contemplates a role

powers specified in the Constitution or implied by those specifications, the states retain
authority over the 'variety of more minute interests' affecting everyday life."); Crocker, supra
note 13, at 2083-84 (recognizing that the Supreme Court used to reject sovereign state
standing, but arguing that the more recent cases, coupled with changed circumstances in
federal-state interaction in the modern world, argue in favor of allowing states to assert
sovereignty claims in federal courts in order to avoid needless formalism). For older articles
making similar normative points, see Maurice S. Culp, Methods of Attacking Unconstitutional
Legislation, 22 VA. L. REV. 723, 732 n.58 (1936) ("Thus it would seem that in many cases the
state would be a proper party plaintiff, to raise the constitutionality of legislation which
affects it in its proprietary or quasi-sovereign rights. In such cases the states could resort to
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of Congressional
legislation affecting their rights even though Congress removes all appellate jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court in other instances of constitutional questions."); Monaghan, supra note
13, at 1367-68 (arguing that, because in federalism cases "the real contestants were Congress
and the states," courts should allow such intergovernmental suits); and see also Cuccinelli et
al., supra note 13, at 111 (elaborating on the standing arguments from Virginia's Fourth
Circuit brief in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius).
91 Davis, supranote 13, at 65 ("[T]he sovereign interests protected by the Constitution were
generally nonjusticiable when a government sued. On this view, reflected in the Cherokee
Nation dictum and its progeny, constitutional litigation would consist primarily of disputes
between private parties and governments.").
92 Id. at 67 ("The United States and the states may use the Constitution as a sword when
public rights, such as their institutional interests, are in controversy, but not simply to
substitute public for private enforcement of the constitutional guarantees of individual
liberty, equality, and property."); id. at 72-84 (detailing the theory).
93 Grove, supra note 13, at 851, 862.
94 Id. at 856 n.23.
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for state governments in its implementation," 95 although she notes
96
that the theory does not align with the historical precedent.
Contrary to the aforementioned scholarly attention, this Article
asserts that the only way to properly understand federal courts'
jurisdiction to hear intergovernmental federalism disputes is to
recognize its complex history. The next Section chronicles the
historical foundation underlying this anomalous jurisdiction.

III. THE HISTORY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FEDERALISM DISPUTES
This Article argues that the critics are correct that
intergovernmental federalism disputes are not traditionally
cognizable by common-law, equity, or admiralty courts. This is
precisely what Eighteenth Century English courts have said.9 7 And
yet, federal courts undeniably have jurisdiction over territorial
boundary disputes. Indeed, these were some of the first cases
brought before the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, 98 and it
was generally understood that the Confederation Congress's
jurisdiction over such disputes had been transferred to federal
courts. 99
Moreover, the Confederation Congress's interstate
jurisdiction was not limited to territorial boundary disputes,
applying instead to "all disputes and differences now subsisting or
that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning
boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever." 100 Indeed, as
the Supreme Court itself has recognized, disputes over which
governing entity has exclusive authority to regulate particular
territory is closely related to disputes over which governing entity
has exclusive authority to regulate particular people, things, or
activities. 101
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the importance of the
Privy Council in understanding the scope of its jurisdiction in
95 Roesler, supra note 13, at 678.
96 Id. at 641.
97 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
98 See New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 3-4 (1799) ("It is is [sic] a bill to settle a
question of boundary between two states. Of this question the Court can, incontestably, take
cognizance .. ");
New Jersey v. New York, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 461, 465, 467 (1830) (exercising
jurisdiction over a dispute regarding the boundary between the two states).
99 See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
100 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 2.
101 See cases cited supra note 51.
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intragovernmental disputes. 10 2 Moreover, the Court has recognized
that the Articles of Confederation placed Congress in the stead once
occupied by the Privy Council as the final tribunal for controversies
between the states. 10 3 The Court has relied on the Privy Council's
jurisdiction in concluding that it, too, has jurisdiction over
intergovernmental controversies beyond territorial boundary
disputes.10 4 These cases, however, have done little more than
gesture toward the history, without detailing or analyzing it.
Indeed, "[h]istorical scholarship has not played an important role in
10 5
defining the scope of original jurisdiction."
This Article seeks to provide a history of this anomalous
The
jurisdiction over intergovernmental federalism disputes.
federal courts' jurisdiction to hear intergovernmental federalism
disputes does not derive from prior judicial courts. Instead, it
derives from the Confederation Congress, and before that the King
in Council, and, in early drafts of the Constitution, was designed to
be exercised by the Senate, until finally the jurisdiction was placed
in the hands of the federal courts. It is a separate grant of
jurisdiction, not common-law, equity, or admiralty in nature.
A. THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND ITS COMMITTEES

From their establishment, the colonies were overseen by the
Privy Council, to whose control Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and the
Channel Islands had traditionally been subject. The Privy Council
was the "principal council belonging to the King," 10 6 a body of
102 See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 597 (1918) ("[lIt early came to pass that
differences between the colonies were taken to the Privy Council for settlement and were
there considered and passed upon during a long period of years, the sanction afforded to the
conclusions of that body being the entire power of the realm, whether exerted through the
medium of a royal decree or legislation by Parliament.").
103 Id.
at 598 ("[Article nine of the Articles of Confederation] in express terms declared the
Congress to be the final arbiter of controversies between the States and provided machinery
for bringing into play a tribunal which had power to decide the same.").
104 See, e.g., id. at 599-600 (exercising jurisdiction over an action by Virginia against West
Virginia for payment of a judgment enforcing a contract between the states); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84 (1907) (exercising jurisdiction over a controversy over whether
Kansas has a right to the continuous flow of the waters of the Arkansas River); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 212, 220-24 (1901) (exercising jurisdiction over a controversy regarding
one state's pollution of an interstate river).
105WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4042.
106 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *229.
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advisers made up of ministers of state, royal officials, bishops, and
other noblemen. 10 7 The Privy Council long exercised three main
categories of legal jurisdiction over the colonies.
The first was to hear appeals from colonial courts.1 0 8 Litigants
who were disappointed with the judgment of a colonial court could
petition the Privy Council for review, so long as the amount in
controversy exceeded £300 and the appeal was within one year of
the adverse decision. 10 9 The Privy Council heard more than 250
colonial appeals between 1680 and 1780.110
The Privy Council's second jurisdictional category was to review
colonial legislation after it had been enacted, either allowing or
disallowing the statutes."1 After reviewing the statute, the Privy
Council would issue a declaration of the validity or invalidity of the
statute.112
107 Winfred T. Root, The Lords of Trade and Plantations,1675-1696, 23 AM. HIST. REV. 20,
20 (1917).
108 See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION 73-90 (2004) ("[P]rivate
cases, particularly these involving large land claims, could be appealed to the Privy Council.");
SMITH, supra note 78, at 420 n.8 (stating that inter-colonial boundary disputes could only be
heard by the King in Council).
109 Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, Part II, POL. SCI. Q.
433, 437 (1913).
110Id. at 447-48. Appeals to the Privy Council from colonial courts afforded colonists "relief
from arbitrary proceedings of colonial courts," and afforded the crown "a means of preventing
important changes in colonial law without the consent of the mother country" and "of
correcting judgments given in the colonial courts to the disadvantage of the crown." Arthur
Meier Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, PartI, POL. SCI. Q. 279, 279 (1913).
Winthrop v. Lechmere, the famous early example of judicial review, was a colonial appeal to
the Privy Council. See Schlesinger, supra note 109, at 440-42; 7 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE

COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 571-79 (1873).
11 In 1696, the Navigation Act was passed, which declared "illegal[,] null[,] and void to all

Intents and Purposes whatsoever" any colonial law that is "repugnant" to a law of "this
Kingdome." 7 & 8 Will. 3 c.22, § 8, reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 105 (John Raithby
eds., 1820). The Board of Trade was the body authorized "to examine into and weigh such
acts of the Assemblies of the Plantations respectively as shall from time to time be sent or
transmitted hither for our approbation." 2 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 16951697, at 418 (1903). The Board was thus the body in charge of reviewing colonial legislation,
and would forward its recommendation to the King in Council, which would take ultimate
action. See OLIVER MORTON DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, 1696-1765, at
227 (1912) ('The real work of considering colonial laws was done by the Board of Trade, and
the final action was only recorded as done by the king in the presence of and with the advice
[sic] of his Privy Council."). For a discussion of this process, see generally ALISON L. LACROIX,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 139-71 (2010); and ELMER BEECHER
RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915).
112 See Charles M. Andrews, The Royal Disallowance, 24 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN Soc. 342,
344-46 (1914).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 4
854

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:831

The third head of the Privy Council's jurisdiction over the
colonies was to hear disputes from colonies regarding
intergovernmental disputes, both over territorial boundaries and
over the governments' respective powers to regulate particular
objects.113
Attempts were made to grant all of these three jurisdictional
heads to the federal government during the composition of the
Constitution in the summer of 1787. The first basis of jurisdiction,
hearing colonial appeals, the Constitution granted to the Supreme
Court and in any inferior appellate courts Congress might create. 114
Madison attempted to establish the second basis of jurisdiction,
legislative review, in the form of a "council of revision" that would
review all enacted state laws before they came into force and would
either allow or disallow them. 115 This provision, however, was
defeated at Philadelphia. 116 The third basis of jurisdiction, the
authority to hear conflicting intergovernmental claims of exclusive
governing power, this Article argues, passed from the Privy Council
to the Confederation Congress under the Articles of Confederation,
before the Constitution ultimately granted it to the Supreme Court.
It is this third basis, the Privy Council's jurisdiction over
intergovernmental territorial and subject-matter boundary
disputes, which is the focus of the following Section.
1. Territorial Boundary Disputes. The Privy Council had
jurisdiction over territorial boundary controversies between
colonies.1 1 7 A colony would petition the Board of Trade, a committee

113
114

See infra Part III.A.2.
2.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.

115 See LACROIX, supra note 111, at 147 ('The federal negative would import the Privy
Council's legislative review mechanism to American shores, establishing the central
government as an umpire over the fractious states ....); Letter from James Madison to
George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 383-84 (William T.
Hutchinson ed., 1975) ("[A] negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the
States, as heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely
necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. Without this
defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper will be evaded & defeated.
The States will continue to invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of
nations & to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views
of interest.").
116 LACROIX, supra note 111, at 147-58.
117 See DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 285-96 (discussing the Board of Trade's role in the

process); HARRY M. WARD, "UNITE OR DIE": INTERCOLONY RELATIONS, 1690-1763, ch. 11

(1971) (discussing the process for intercolony boundary dispute resolution).
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within the Privy Council,11 8 to determine a boundary between it and
another colony or an Indian tribe. 119 Either the Board would decide
the matter itself, or a Commission would be appointed to determine
the boundary line, and the colonies could then appeal the
Commission's finding to the Board. 120 The Privy Council, through
its Board of Trade, settled at least nine such territorial boundary
disputes.121
As an example of this process, consider the case of Rhode Island
and Massachusetts. The two colonies disputed over which one had
exclusive regulatory authority over territory near Narragansett
County, with the claim ultimately coming down to the construction
of their charters. 122 Rhode Island sent a petition to the Privy
Council in 1734, which sent it to the Board of Trade, which in turn
ordered the constitution of a royal inter-colonial commission of
arbitration to decide the matter. 123 After a full legal argument by
counsel hired by the colonies, the Commission interpreted the
charters as granting most of the territory to Rhode Island. Both
colonies then appealed to the Board of Trade, which, after further

118 The Board of Trade and Plantations was established on May 15, 1696, by William III,
with the authority to oversee and improve the colonies, review colonial legislation, and receive
petitions. Before this body was established, several earlier committees had jurisdiction to
hear petitions from the colonies and deliver a recommendation to the King in Council,
beginning in 1660. See 1 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND: COLONIAL SERIES, 16131680, at 295 (1908); Root, supra note 107, at 20 (noting the "marked trend toward
administrative dominance in all that had to do with the advancement of the interests and
ideals of the empire" during the period). See generally RALPH PAUL BIEBER, THE LORD OF

TRADE AND PLANTATIONS, 1675-1696 (1919).

119See, e.g., DICKERSON, supranote 111, at 294 (providing the opinion of the Board of Trade
in settling the boundary between New York and Massachusetts).
120 See DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 295-96 ("[T]he Board of Trade acted as a high court
of arbitration for disputes as to territory or jurisdiction ....
[I]t provided a way by which such
controversies could be determined by special commissions. These were in reality special
courts of arbitration... from which an appeal would lie to the Board."); SMITH, supra note
78, at 421 ("[1]n 1773, it was alleged that in every question of boundary between two colonies,
the King, in Privy Council, exercises original jurisdiction ....
(internal quotation marks
omitted)).
121 John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 6 (1948); see also WARD, supra note 117, at 204-26 (detailing the disputes).
122 SMITH, supra note 78, at 449.
123 Id. at 449-51; WARD, supra note 117, at 205; Clyde Miser Ferrell, The Massachusetts
Colonial Agents in England 175-76 (May 28, 1923) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin) (on file with South Illinois University).
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legal argument, affirmed the commission. Finally, on May 28, 1746,
124
the King in Council affirmed the decision.
Similarly, New York and Massachusetts had long disputed the
location of the boundary separating the two colonies. Although the
provinces had agreed to appoint commissioners to settle the
boundary in June, 1754, "each party stat[ed its] claim according to
the descriptive words in the[ir] respective grant of Charter of each
province. ' 125 The charters appeared mutually exclusive, with the
1 26
result that the Commissioners could not come to a conclusion.
Benjamin Fletcher, Governor of New York, petitioned the Board of
Trade to settle the boundary issue between the colonies. 127 The
Board asked the two colonies to send agents to argue the case. After
the proceedings were complete, the Board construed the respective
colonial grants to determine their meaning and sent it to the King
to approve in Council. 128 Once construed, the Board established a
commission to delineate the boundary.129
Numerous other inter-colonial border disputes were brought to
the King in Council, asking for an interpretation of charters to
1 30
ascertain the boundary line.
Sometimes, the Privy Council heard the boundary controversy in
For
the first instance without an intermediate commission.
instance, in July, 1764, the King in Council exercised "original"
jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between New York and New
131
Hampshire and delineated that boundary.
Thus, the King in Council, through the Privy Council and the
Board of Trade, adjudicated numerous inter-colonial territorial
boundary disputes. The format resembled legal proceedings, except

124
125

SMITH, supra note 78, at 452-53; WARD, supra note 117, at 206.
Representation of the Lords of Trade to the King (May 25, 1757), in DOCUMENTS

RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 223.
126 Id.

Id.
Id. at 224; DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 294.
129 DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 294.
130 For example, the Privy Council resolved boundary disputes between Connecticut and
the Mohegan Indian tribes, SMITH, supra note 78, at 422-42; DICKERSON, supra note 111, at
295; Massachusetts and New Hampshire, SMITH, supra note 78, at 442-49; New York and
New Jersey, SMITH, supra note 78, at 453-63; DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 291-93; and
New York and Connecticut, DICKERSON, supra note 111, at 288-90.
127

128

131

See 4 E.B. O'CALLAGHAN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 355

(Albany, N.Y., Charles Van Benthuysen 1851); SMITH, supra note 78, at 421.
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that the jurisdiction was one that common-law, equity, and
admiralty courts did not exercise; rather, it was a jurisdiction
wielded by the King in Council. 132 The initiating party would send
a petition to the King in Council stating that there was a
"[c]ontroversy between" the colonies concerning the boundary and
asking the King to "[d]etermine" the border. 133 These controversies
involved disputes over which colony had the exclusive authority to
govern a particular territory. The claims were necessarily mutually
exclusive.
As Joseph Henry Smith has put it, the territorial boundary
disputes were actually a form of subject-matter boundary disputes,
as they concerned inter-colonial clashes "over jurisdiction to tax, to
levy military service, and to issue judicial process." 134 It is therefore
not surprising that the Privy Council also heard inter-colonial
disputes over more incorporeal objects.
2. Subject-Matter-Boundary Disputes. The Privy Council also
possessed jurisdiction over subject-matter boundary disputes, in
which a colony would petition the King in Council to declare
whether or not a colony had exclusive jurisdiction over particular
people, things, or activities, to the exclusion of other colonies, or
even to the exclusion of the King or Parliament. This Article
recognizes the connection of these disputes to our constitutional
history.
a. New Jersey's Authority To Establish a Port. On September
8, 1697, the proprietors of East and West Jersey (which would later
be combined into the province of New Jersey), sent a petition asking
for a declaration that the provinces had the authority, derived from
their original grants, to establish a port at Perth Amboy in New
York Bay and that the province of New York could not interfere with
that right. 135 The proprietors claimed that the original grants to the
Duke of York gave them the "power" to establish a port in New York

132

See cases cited supra notes 78-79.

.1

See, e.g., 3 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL: COLONIAL SERIES, supra note 118, at 436

(petitioning the King to determine the border between Rhode Island and Massachusetts Bay).
134 SMITH, supra note 78 at 443.
135 See

JOHN E.

POMFRET,

THE PROVINCE

OF EAST NEW JERSEY,

1609-1702:

THE

REBELLIOUS PROPRIETARY 313 (1962) (describing the disagreement between proprietors of
the two states concerning the port); see also 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW JERSEY HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 142-46 (1867) ("[It was the insertion of the Jerseymen to make 'New Perth' a free
port ...").
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Bay and that they were not "depend[e]nt on or part of the Province
of New York." 136 Nevertheless, the Petition stated, the province of
New York "pretend[s] and presume[s] to make all ships" bound for
the Jersey provinces "to come to New York to unlade or to pay
[c]ustom[] there."137 The proprietors, however, claimed that that
their "[r]ights" had "been [i]nvaded by the Government of New
York" and asked the Board of Trade to declare as much and restrain
New York from such actions. 138 The Board of Trade asked the
Attorney General and Solicitor General for their opinion. 139 After
hearing oral argument from the provinces' representatives over
whether New York or the Jersey provinces had exclusive control
over establishing a port in New York Bay, the Attorney General and
Solicitor General responded that in their opinion the power of
establishing ports was not included in the grants for the Jersey
provinces.1 40 After reviewing the grants that had established the
Jersey provinces, the Lords of Trade agreed that they did not have
the authority to establish their own ports. The Jersey provinces,
the Lords reasoned, used to be a part of the New York province.
When the province was divided, the power to establish ports

136

2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 164-

65 (William A. Whitehead ed., 1881) [hereinafter COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY].
137Id. at 165.
138 Id. at 165, 169; see William Dockra, State of the Case of the Proprietors of East Jersey,
submitted to the Lords of Trade ("By [royal] grants the proprietors claim ...that they have
a right and power of constituting ports within the said Province. That they have accordingly
constituted the Port of Perth Amboy, in the said Province, and that diverse ships for several
years come directly to the said Port, and have there unladed undisturbed. But the Collector
& Officers of New York, have since presumed to molest the said Proprietors, in the free use,
and privilege, of their said Port, and pretend to compel all ships bound to East Jersey to come
to New York and pay a custom or impost laid upon goods there, according to an Act of their
General Assembly.... That the Proprietors conceive neither the said Act of the General
Assembly of New York, nor the said instructions can bind the Proprietors of East Jersey to
pay customs, or hinder them from the use of their own Port ...for as much as East Jersey is
a distinct and independent Province from New York, where the inhabitants of East Jersey
have no representatives." (spelling, punctuation, and capitalization modernized)), in
COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 136, at 171-73.
139 Letter from Secretary Popple, to the Attorney General and Solicitor General, Enquiring
as to the Authority of the Proprietors of East Jersey to constitute ports in their Province (Oct.
6, 1697), in COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 136, at 174-75.
140 Thomas Trevor & John Hawles, Answer of Attorney General and Solicitor General, to
the Enquiries of the Lords of Trade (Oct. 18, 1697), in COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY,
supra note 136, at 177-78.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/4

28

Shelfer: Intergovernmental Federalism Disputes

2018] INTERGOVERNMENTAL FEDERALISM DISPUTES

859

remained in New York alone. 14 1 The King in Council accepted the
recommendation of the Lords of Trade and dismissed the petition. 142
Jeremiah Basse, Governor of East and West Jersey, however,
was not satisfied. On May 30, 1698, he established Perth Amboy as
a port, arguing that, while provinces may not have the authority
under their original grants to establish ports, the Perth Amboy port
was still authorized because the royal Commissioners of Customs
set up customs officers at Perth Amboy. 143 Whereas the earlier
petition adjudicated by the Privy Council had asked for a
declaration of the respective authorities exercised by the Jersey and
New York provinces, the Jersey proprietors now submitted a new
petition to the King, stating that the crown had authorized the port
and asking that he "consent to a trial at bar in Westminster Hall
upon a feigned issue, whereby your petitioner's claim may receive a
145
judicial determination."' 144 The Lords of Trade agreed.
Because the provinces could not simply ask a court of law to
determine the legal issue, Jersey Governor Basse had to contrive a
case. He loaded the "Hester," a small ship, and sent it into the New
York Bay. New York Governor Bellomont had the ship seized, and
Basse sued Bellomont in a suit for trover. 146 The jury trial was held
at Westminster Hall, with Lord Holt, Chief Justice of England,

141 John Egerton et al., Representation from the Lords of Trade to the Lords Justices,
against the right of the Proprietors of East Jersey to establish Ports (Oct. 27, 1696), in
COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supranote 136, at 180-85. As the Lords of Trade argued,
the Jerseys and New York used to be a single province with the single port in Manhattan.
Since each body of water traditionally has only a single port, when the Jerseys became
separate provinces, they had not been granted the authority to establish their own ports. Id.
142John Povey, Order of Council, directing the payment of all duties to the Governor of New
York, by vessels trading in Hudson's River, in COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note
136, at 200.
143Proclamation of Governor Basse, establishing Perth Amboy as a Port (May 30, 1698), in
COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supranote 136, at 227-28.
144William Dockra et al., The Humble Petition of the Proprietors of the Province of East
Jersey in America, in COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 136, at 257 (spelling
and capitalization modernized).
145See Letter from Secretary Popple to William Dockra (Apr. 14, 1699) (informing
petitioners that the Lords of Trade intend to petition the King for a trial of the issue), in
COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 136, at 266-67; John Egerton et al.,
Representation from the Lords of Trade to the King, informing him of their determination to
have the claim to a Port in East Jersey tried in Westminster Hall (Apr. 18, 1699) (Lords of
Trade propose to the King said trial), in COLONIAL HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY, supra note 136,
at 267-68.
146POMFRET, supra note 135, at 318, 323-24.
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presiding. 147 The plaintiff argued that New York cannot seize ships
bound for the Jersey provinces and force them to pay New York
customs because the Jersey provinces are not dependencies of New
York.1 48 After the argument, Lord Holt addressed the jury. He
stated that the question was whether the seizure of the ship was
lawful, and that this depended on whether the Jersey provinces
149
were dependencies of New York or were independent provinces.
The jury found for the Jersey provinces. 150 This victory, however,
was short-lived, as two years later the proprietors surrendered the
151
colony to the Crown.
The Perth Amboy port affair displays the difference between
inter-colonial disputes tried before the Privy Council and suits tried
in a common-law court. The Jersey provinces petitioned the King
in Council when it sought a determination of whether it or New
York had the mutually exclusive power to establish a port in the
Jersey provinces. On the other hand, when the Jersey provinces
wished to have a judicial determination of whether the Crown had
itself already authorized a port at Perth Amboy, it contrived facts
allowing one individual to bring a common-law action against
another in a court of law.
b. Indian-Trade Licensing Acts. Many colonies had laws that
required licenses for anyone who desired to trade with Indians
residing within a particular colony. 152 Georgia's Indian Act of 1735,
147 See WILLIAM A. WHITEHEAD, EAST JERSEY UNDER THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENTS
206-07 (Newark, N.J., Martin R. Dennis, 2d ed. 1875); Chauncey G. Parker, An Early
Decision on IntercolonialRights, 18 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483-84 (1905);.
148Basse v. Bellamont (May 10, 1700), as reprinted in Parker, supra note 147, at 484-91.
149 Id. at 491-94.
150 Id. at 494.
151 See 3 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 177-81

(1937) ("The proprietors have agreed to the terms proposed, the articles of surrender were
issued April 15, 1702, and accepted by the queen in council two days later."); POMFRET, supra
note 135, at 323-24 ("Perth Amboy was confirmed as a free port ....This triumph, however,
came too late to be of practical value to the proprietary of East Jersey for two years later the
proprietors surrendered the colony to the crown."); Parker, supranote 147, at 484 ("[T]he real
point in controversy was whether New Jersey had any rightful proprietary government. This
question was raised in the case, but not decided. Yet Lord Holt's views... had a great moral
effect upon the New Jersey Proprietors by convincing them that expediency required a
surrender of their government to the Crown. This they accordingly made in the year 1702.").
152 See, e.g., An Act for the better regulation of the Indian Trade, S.C. Pub. L. No. 447 (Sept.
19, 1721) (regulating trade between "the inhabitants of this Province and the several Indian
nations"), reprinted in 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 141-46 (Thomas
Cooper ed., Columbia, S.C., A.S. Johnston 1838); W. ROY SMITH, SOUTH CAROLINA AS AROYAL
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for instance, required everyone who desired to trade with Indians
within the Province of Georgia to obtain a license. 153 Georgia also
enacted the Rum Act of 1735, which allowed Georgian officials to
board other boats on the Savannah that belonged to residents of
154
other colonies and confiscate their rum.
South Carolina sent a petition to the Board of Trade through its
lieutenant governor Thomas Broughton, asking the Board to declare
that a colony does not have the authority to prevent those from other
colonies from trading with the Indians within its borders .and does
not have the authority to prevent those from other colonies from
using the Savannah. 15 5 The petition claimed that "Georgia [had]
assume[d] the authority of obliging all persons," even those from
56
other colonies, "to take out l[i]censes to trade with the Indians."'
Georgia, South Carolina asserted, cannot "take upon themselves the
sole management of Indian affairs for several of [the King's]
Colon[ie]s in North America." 157 South Carolina also objected to
Georgia's "infringing the natural rights and libert[ie]s of [the
King's] subjects of this Province by stop[p]ing their free and open
navigation of the river Savannah," which was meant not to be
controlled by any one colony, but rather be the "natural boundary
between the two Provinces." 158 South Carolina asked the King to
"declare the rights and libert[ie]s of his faithful[] subjects of this
your Province to an open and free trade" with the Indians and

PROVINCE, 1719-1776, at 216-19 (1903) (discussing the regulation of Indian trade in South
Carolina).
1-3An Act for maintaining the Peace with the Indians in Province of Georgia (Apr. 3, 1735),
reprinted in 1 ALLEN D. CANDLER, THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 31-44
(1904) [hereinafter 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF GEORGIA].
154 An Act to prevent the Importation and Use of Rum and Brandies in the Province of
Georgia (Apr. 3, 1735), reprintedin 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF GEORGIA, supra note 153, at 4449.
151Petition and Representation of the Council and Assembly of S. Carolina to the King (July
17, 1736) [hereinafter Petition to the King], in 42 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL

SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1735-1736, at 367-75 (1953) [hereinafter 42 CALENDAR

OF STATE PAPERS]; Letter from Thomas Broughton to Board of Trade (Aug. 6, 1736)
[hereinafter Letter to Board of Trade], in 42 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 155, at
261-69. For a discussion of this controversy, see JOHN PITTS CORRY, INDIAN AFFAIRS IN
GEORGIA, 1732-1756, at 51-66 (1936); and JULIE ANNE SWEET, NEGOTIATING FOR GEORGIA:
BRITISH-CREEK RELATIONS IN THE TRUSTEE ERA, 1733-1752, at 100-05 (2005).
156
157
158

Petition to the King, supra note 155, at 370.
Id.
Id. at 372-73.
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declare the Savannah river "free and open to all [the King's] subjects
159
of this Province."
Broughton elaborated on the claim in his accompanying letter,
stating that Georgia "claim[ed] the sole power of granting licenses
to trade with the Indians that l[i]e within the limits of Georgia, or
with such Indians as are to the southward of those limits." 160 A
colony's laws, Broughton claimed, are "obligatory on the people of
the Colony for which it was made, but not on the people of another
Colony, who are no part[ie]s to the same." 161 Broughton therefore
framed the question to the Board of Trade thus:
whether the act of [one colony] can bind a free and
independent people who live within the limits of their
Charter or can obstruct the subjects of any other
Colony, from a free and open trade with them? Or
whether any of [one colony's] subjects, can be restrained
by an Act made by [another colony] from carrying their
goods thro[ugh] Georgia, to any nation of Indians which
l[i]e beyond them, or whether such a restraint can be
laid by any other authority than that of the Parliament
1 62
of Great Britain?
South Carolina and Georgia each hired a team of London counsel
to represent them before the Board of Trade.16 3 The Board held four
lengthy proceedings, 164 and, after considering the case, distilled it
into two questions: whether a colonial act "can grant to any of the
said Provinces an exclusive trade with the Indians, dwelling within
their respective Provinces"; and whether Georgia's act actually does

162

Id. at 375.
Letter to the Board of Trade, supra note 155, at 263.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 266.

163

EDWARD J. CASHIN, GUARDIANS OF THE VALLEY: CHICKASAWS IN COLONIAL SOUTH

15
160
161

CAROLINA AND GEORGIA 37-39 (2009) (noting that "[e]ach of the provinces secured the
services of learned counsels"); CORRY, supra note 155, at 54 (providing further details
regarding the respective counsel).
164

These proceedings are reprinted in 7 JOURNAL OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR TRADE AND

PLANTATIONS (1930) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE COMMISSIONERS] at the following pages:
181-83 (May 19, 1737); 189-93 (June 6, 1737); 196-99 (June 9, 1737); and 201-02 (June 18,
1737).
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so. 165 The Board sent these questions to the Attorney and Solicitor
General for their opinion.1 66 In response, the Attorney and Solicitor
General opined that such a law would be "repugnant to the laws of
Great Britain," and that Georgia's law was indeed such an invalid
law.167 The Board of Trade adopted this opinion. 168 Georgia
appealed to the Privy Council, but the Council agreed with the
Board, and it issued instructions, which the King signed on July 21,
1738, ordering Georgia to issue the licenses to anyone who applies
16 9
for them.
Again, the Privy Council here exercised jurisdiction over an
inter-colonial dispute concerning whether Georgia had the exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate trade with Indian tribes and trade in the
Savannah River, or whether its regulatory jurisdiction was
concurrent with South Carolina's.
c. Governor Phips Controversy. King William's War was the
occasion of another such inter-colonial dispute. On August 2, 1692,
the government of Rhode Island petitioned the King in Council
complaining that Governor Phips, the newly installed governor of
Massachusetts, "declared himself empowered with the Militia of
[Rhode Island]," and asked that colony to "propose men for
commissions."' 1 70 Rhode Island, however, argued that its "patent
[gave it] sole control over the militia.""17 The colony asked the King
in Council "to send [it] immediate confirmation of your Government
here according to the limits and boundaries of the patent and of
previous decisions."1 72 Having heard no reply, the colony sent a
Id. at 203 (June 21, 1737).
Id.
167 D. Ryder & J. Strange, The opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General (July 28, 1737)
[Me are of opinion that as an absolute trade with the Indians would be destructive of that
general right of trading which all his Majesty's subjects are entitled to; and, therefore,
repugnant to the laws of Great Britain, no act of the trustees of Georgia... can grant [such
165
166

authority]."), in GEORGE CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF
ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 591-92 (1858).
168 See 7 JOURNAL OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 164, at 213 ("The report to the Lords

of the Committee upon the subject of the dispute between South Carolina and Georgia... was
signed.").
169 5 COLONIAL RECORDS OF GEORGIA, supra note 153, at 55.
170 14 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES 151 (J.W.
Fortsecue ed., 1908) [hereinafter 14 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS]; 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY

OF RHODE ISLAND 288-300 (1858) (reprinting the petition).
17114 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 170, at 152.
172

Id.
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follow-up petition on November 22, 1692, "since a difference ha[d]3
17
arisen between [it] and Sir William Phips as to [its] boundaries."
In other words, Rhode Island claimed that its and Massachusetts's
respective charters did not allow Massachusetts's Governor to have
control, let alone exclusive control, of Rhode Island's militia, and
also that even a patent from the King could not change those
jurisdictional boundaries that were enshrined in the royal charters.
1 74
Rhode Island asked the King to declare that this was So.
The Privy Council referred the petition to the Lords of Trade and
Plantations, who in turn referred it to the Attorney General. 175 On
December 7, 1693, the Attorney General reported back to the Lords
of Trade and Plantations, after "inspecting the charters" of the
colonies, that
[b]y the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut the
governors and officers of the Companies are empowered
to nominate commanders of the militia; but Sir William
Phips's commission appointed him commander-in-chief
of the forces of both colonies ....We think therefore
that the command of the militia rests with the several
provinces, but that in times of urgency the King may
176
appoint a commander-in-chief to take command of all.
The colonies' counsel in London then presented oral argument
before the King in Council. 177 On April 19, 1694, the King in Council
ordered that
the charters of these Governments give the ordinary
power over the militia to these Governments, but we
think that the Crown has power to appoint a
Commander-in-Chief over the quotas to be furnished in
time of war and at times of great emergency over the
whole of their militia, but that in time of peace the

Id.
Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
173

174

at
at
at
at

152 ("[W]e beg that we may keep the boundaries appointed to us by our Charter.").
151.
277.
282-83.
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command of the militia ought to revert to the Governors
178
of the several colonies.
Thus, the King in Council declared that, under the present royal
charters, a colony has exclusive regulatory control over its militia,
and that, at least in peacetime, neither another colony nor the crown
itself can interfere with that exclusive colonial authority.
This petition included both a horizontal and a vertical
intergovernmental dispute. First, Rhode Island claimed that it, and
not Massachusetts, had exclusive control over the Rhode Island
militia. Second, Rhode Island claimed that not even the crown had
the power to change Rhode Island's charter, at least in normal
times. Again, this petition presented intergovernmental disputes,
asking the King in Council to determine which government had
exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over a particular subject-matter.
d. Governors' Sdlaries. The Privy Council would also hear
disputes concerning the respective authorities of the crownappointed governors on the one hand, and the popularly elected
assemblies on the other. 179 Thus, disputes between colony and
crown, forerunners of modern vertical federalism disputes between
states and the United States, took place in the form of controversies
between the Governor and the representative house of assembly.
For instance, colonial assemblies and their King-appointed
governors often clashed over the question of salary, that is, whether
it should be permanent, or whether it would have to be annually
approved by the colonial assembly. 8 0 In 1728, this issue arose in
Massachusetts when William Burnet, former Governor of New
The
York, was appointed Governor of Massachusetts.1 8 1
Id.
In all of the colonies, save for Pennsylvania, the legislatures were composed of two
houses: an upper council appointed by the governor, and a lower assembly that was locally
elected. In Pennsylvania, the legislature was entirely made up of local representatives.
178

179

EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH
AMERICA 145 (1966).
180 See, e.g., William Pencak, Warfare and Political Change in MidEighteenth-Century

Massachusetts (discussing the controversy over the Massachusetts's governor's salary), in
THE BRITISH ATLANTIC EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 53-54 (Peter Marshall

& Glyn Williams eds., 2005).
181

See

id.;

see

also RICHARD

L.

BUSHMAN,

KING

AND

PEOPLE

IN

PROVINCIAL

MASSACHUSETTS 119-20 (2013) (discussing Burnet's attempts to secure a permanent salary
for the executive).
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Massachusetts assembly offered to grant Governor Burnet a salary
for the year, but Burnet refused to accept anything other than a
permanent salary, contending that anything less would violate the
instruction of the King installing him as Governor and would make
him subservient to and dependent on the colonial assembly.1 S2 The
King's instruction had ordered that the Assembly "establish a fixed
& honourable Salary for the supporting & maintaining the Dignity
of [the] Governor." 18 3 The House insisted that its charter gave it the
exclusive authority to determine its governor's salary, and that for
them to be subject to the King's instruction would be "against the
Design of the Power so vested in them" by their charter and would
"weaken if not destroy our happy Constitution, by our giving away
the great and almost only Privile[ ]ge that gives Weight to the
House of Representatives," namely the control of the purse.18 4 The
House asserted that
[b]ecause the [charter] fully impowers the General
Assembly to make such Laws and Orders as they judge
for the good and welfare of the Inhabitants; and if they
or any part of them judge this not to be for their good,
they neither ought nor can come into it, for, as to act
beyond, or without the Powers granted in the [charter],
18 5
might justly incur the King's Displeasure.
After months of wrangling, Burnet refused to dissolve the
Assembly to allow the representatives to return home, and removed
the meeting place of the Assembly from Boston to Salem. In
response, the House sent a petition to the King in Council, asserting
that
the raising and disposing of money from time to time, of
our free will and assent, for the defen[s]e and support of
the Government and protection and preservation of the
182

See 8 JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1727-1729, at

315-16 (1927) [hereinafter 8 J. OF H.R. OF MASS.] (explaining that the governor refused the
compromise as it was "contrary to His Majest[y's] [ilnstruction").
183 WILLIAM NELSON, ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LIFE AND ADMINISTRATIONS

OF WILLIAM BURNET, at 177 (Patterson, N.J., The Press Printing & Publ'g Co., 1897).
184 J. of H.R. MASS., supra note 182, at 316.
185 Id.
at 318.
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inhabitants, is the great privile[ ]ge, which as
Englishmen by Magna Charta and by the Charter
granted by King William and Queen Mary of glorious
Memory, the General Assembly, (as we humbly
1 86
conceive) have a right unto.
The House and the Governor each procured counsel to argue the
case before the Board of Trade, after which the Board sent its
recommendation to the King.18 7
The Board construed
Massachusetts's charter, by which the Assembly is "empowered" to
impose and dispose of taxes "in [the] necessary defen[s]e and
support of the Government," to require a permanent salary for the
Governor, because the Governor is a part of the "Government of
[the] province."18 8
This dispute offers another example of the sort of
intergovernmental controversy that the Privy Council would
cognize. The crown-appointed governor and the popularly elected
assembly each claimed the exclusive authority to regulate governor
salaries.
These examples of disputes heard by the Privy Council suggest
that the intergovernmental disputes heard by the King in Council
were requests by one governing entity that the Council declare
which entity, if any, has mutually exclusive regulatory jurisdiction
over a particular territory, people, or activity.
B. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PETITIONS TO THE KING

In the decade before the Revolution, the Privy Council had waned
in its authority over the colonies. In the 1760s and 1770s, the
colonies began sending petitions directly to the King that resembled
those formerly sent to the Privy Council. Just as the subject-matter
186 Address of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay to the King (Feb. 1, 1729),
in 36 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES 312 (Cecil
Headlam ed., 1937) [hereinafter 36 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS].
187 Council of Trade and Plantations to the Duke of Newcastle (Mar. 27, 1729), in 36

CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, supra note 186, at 338.
188 Id. at 339. Before the affair was resolved, Burnet died, and Jonathan Belcher, who had
been arguing the case before the Board of Trade on behalf of the Massachusetts Assembly,
lobbied for and received the governorship. See MICHAEL C. BATINSKI, JONATHAN BELCHER,
COLONIAL GOVERNOR 49-50 (1996) (detailing the events resulting in Belcher's receipt of the

governorship); BUSHMAN, supra note 181, at 120.
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boundary disputes asked the King to adjudicate the lines
demarcating the boundaries of regulatory power between colonies
or between the colonies and the crown, so these pre-revolutionary
petitions asked the King to declare the limits that separated
Parliamentary legislative power and colonial legislative power. As
Bernard Bailyn put it, "[t]he original issue of the Anglo-American
conflict was, of course, the question of the extent of Parliament's
jurisdiction in the colonies." 18 9 In the wake of the Stamp Act,
"leading colonial writers were attacking the problem of sovereignty"
by locating "a line of separation between powers of Parliament that
were valid when exercised in America and those that were not." 190
The colonies asserted in their petitions that, although Parliament
had total governing power over transatlantic matters, the colonies
had exclusive regulatory authority over purely local matters, such
as internal taxation, which Parliament could only regulate only if
the colonies so allowed.191
On December 18, 1764, for instance, the Virginia House of
Burgesses petitioned the King "to protect your [p]eople of this
[c]olony in the [e]njoyment of their ancient and inestimable [r]ight
of being governed by such [flaws respecting their internal [p]olity
and [t]axation as are derived from their own [c]onsent, with the
[a]pprobation of their [s]overeign."1 92 On April 14, 1768, the House
of Burgesses repeated this same request, 193 and on June 27, 1770,
sent a third petition to the King, reiterating their "[c]laims to be free
and exempt from all [t]axes imposed on us, without our own
[c]onsent, for the [p]urpose of raising and establishing a [r]evenue
1 94
in America."'
On May 7, 1768, the New Jersey House of Representatives sent
a petition to the King in which they sought protection of their

189 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20 (1992).

Id. at 208.
191 See id. at 209 ("No distinction could be more obvious or more fundamental than that
190

between things 'internal' and things 'external.' ").
192
193

JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761-1765, at 302 (1907).
See JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1766-1769, at 165 (John

Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906).
194

JOURNALS

OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES

OF VIRGINIA, 1770-1772,

at 101 (John

Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906).
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"privilege of being exempt from any taxation, but such as is imposed
on them by themselves, or by their representatives."' 195
On December 5, 1768, the North Carolina Assembly sent a
Petition and Remonstrance to the King criticizing Parliament's
taxation measures. 196 The Assembly argued that the province's
"Representatives in Assembly can alone be the proper [j]udges not
only of what sum they are able to pay, but likewise of the most
eligible method of collecting the same."197 The Assembly stated that
its subjects have "enjoyed as Britons the privile[ ]ges of an
exemption from any [t]axations but such as have been imposed on
them by themselves or their representatives."'1 98 Parliament's
taxation "for the sole and express purpose of raising a [r]evenue,"
the Assembly argued, is "a [t]axation which we are firmly persuaded
the acknowledged [p]rinciples of the British Constitution ought to
protect us from[.]
Free men cannot be legally taxed but by
themselves or their Representatives. 9 9
On October 29, 1768, the New Hampshire House of
Representatives petitioned the King, arguing that his predecessors
granted the province the
[p]ower of [l]egislation limited to the approbation or
disallowance of the Crown with the [p]ower and
[p]rivile[ ]ge essential to British liberty of [r]aising
[i]nternal [t]axes by their own Representatives, which
privile[ ]ge and [r]ight they from the first erecting [of] a
[g]overnment here, and we after them have [enjoyed]
till the late Acts of Parliament [e]nacted for the sole &
[express [p]urpose of [r]aising a [r]evenue in America;
which acts we would humbly [riepresent to your
20 0
majesty are subversive of those [r]ights.

195
196

30 THE SCOTS MAGAZINE 522 (W. Sands, A. Murray & J. Cochran eds., Edinburgh 1768).
See 7 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 980 (William L. Saunders ed.,

Raleigh, N.C., 1890).
197 Id. at 981.
198 Id.
199

Id.

200

7 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE, FROM

1764 TO 1776, at 249 (Nathaniel Bouton ed., Nashua, N.H. 1873).
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On March 25, 1775, the New York Assembly sent a petition to
the King arguing that "no [t]axes should be imposed on them
or
by their
given
personally,
their consent
without
Representatives." 20 1 Whereas "the British Parliament (in which
[there is] no [colonial] representation) have claimed and exercised a
right of making laws, binding upon [the colonies] in all cases
whatsoever," the Assembly considered this "exercise of unlimited
power by the Parliament... [as] directly tending to the subversion
of [their] constitutional liberties." 20 2 "[The Assembly added, [w]e are
willing, to the utmost of our abilities, to contribute our proportion
for the support of Government; but we would do it in a constitutional
manner, by the interposition of the [Colony Legislature]. '' 2°3
Similarly, the Assembly said that Parliament's laws such as the
"Act prohibiting the Legislature of this Colony from passing any law
for the emission of Paper Currency, to be a legal tender therein,
is... a violation of our legislative rights. '20 4 The colony ended by
expressing confidence that the King would confirm a government
"as will sufficiently ascertain and limit the authority claimed by the
20 5
British Legislature over this Colony."
In 1771, John Dickinson composed a petition to the King from
the colony of Pennsylvania, in which the colony asked "to be restored
to... the invaluable exclusive Privilege" of paying taxes only
voluntarily. 20 6 The colony asked the King to "always make the
[p]reservation of the [c]onstitutional [r]ights of [his] Subjects a
20 7
principal [o]bject of [his majesty's] [a]ttention."
Thomas Jefferson adopted this jurisdictional language in his
Summary View of the Rights of British America, which he wrote in
1774, intending that the first Continental Congress should send it
as a petition to the King. 208 Jefferson wrote of the "political
principles which exempt us from the jurisdiction of the British

201 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES 1314 (Washington, D.C., 1837).
202 Id.
203

(emphasis omitted).

Id.

204 Id. at 1315 (emphasis omitted).
205 Id.
206 Petition to the King (Mar. 5, 1771), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON

451-52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Philadelphia, Pa., Hist. Sec'y of Pa. 1895).
207 Id.
208 Thomas Jefferson, Summary View of the Rights of British America (July 1774), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 121 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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parliament," and averred that "the British parliament has no right
to exercise authority over us." 209 Jefferson exhorted the King to use
his power of withholding his assent "to prevent the passage of laws
by any one legislature of the empire which might bear injuriously
on the rights and interests of another," i.e., veto acts of Parliament
that impinge upon the rights of the colonies. 210 "No longer persevere
in sacrificing the rights of one part of the empire to the inordinate
desires of another: but deal out to all equal and impartial right. Let
no act be passed by any one legislature which may infringe on the
2 11
rights and liberties of another."
Thus, in the lead-up to revolution, the procedure of petitioning
the King to determine the boundaries that separate the
jurisdictional authority of governing entities remained a major
procedural avenue for colonies wishing to resolve their disputes
with Parliament. Like the petitions to the Privy Council before
them, these Revolution-era petitions to the King sought a
declaration of the respective regulatory jurisdictions possessed by
the colonies on the one hand and Parliament on the other. Like
those prior petitions to the King in Council, the colonies claimed the
sole authority to regulate purely internal matters to the exclusion
of Parliament. Also like those prior petitions to the King in Council,
the colonies' procedure of adjudicating these intergovernmental
disputes was to ask the King to demarcate the boundaries
separating the governments' powers. It is no surprise, then, that,
in the wake of revolution, the Confederation Congress would
propose that it have that same authority in its Articles of
Confederation.
C. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

The colonies had long known the importance of having an
authority to demarcate competing assertions of exclusive
governmental power.
Beginning in the seventeenth century,
colonies proposed plans of union that would establish such an
authority with the power to decide disputes between colonies
concerning territory, jurisdiction, or other controversy.

209
210
211

Id. at 125.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 134.
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On February 8, 1696, for instance, William Penn, the founder of
the Pennsylvania colony, presented to the Board of Trade a scheme
for a union of the colonies. 212 The "business" of this union was "to
hear and adjust all matters of [c]omplaint or differences between
Province and Province." 213 Penn gave examples of the differences
among the provinces that the Union would adjudicate, including
"where persons quit their own province and go to another, that they
may avoid their just debts though they be able to pay them," "where
offenders fly justice, or justice cannot well be had upon such
offenders in the provinces that entertain them," or "to prevent or
21 4
cure injuries in point of commerce."
In 1701, an anonymous essay was published in London calling
for a "method" to be established, "binding to all the colonies on the
continent," that would, like Penn's plan, (1) "decide all controversies
between colony and colony"; (2) "bring all persons to condign
punishment, who commit offenses against the laws of one colony,
and then fly into another, or who living in one colony, go into
another, and commit offenses, and then return to their own
habitations"; (3) "compel fugitive debtors to pay their just debts, and
run-away servants and slaves, to be returned to their masters living
in other colonies"; and (4) "adjust all disputes concerning trade or
21 5
commerce in the several colonies."
A colonial union with such authority never materialized, and the
colonies continued to seek redress with the King and Council
through his Privy Council and Board of Trade to resolve their
intercolonial disputes.
After declaring independence, however, the newly-minted states
turned to constructing an authority to resolve inter-state
controversies. When the First Continental Congress convened in
1774, even before the prospect of independence had become
palpable, many delegates argued that the colonies must establish a

212

William Penn's Plans for a Union of the Colonies (Feb. 8, 1696-97), reprinted in 11 PA.

MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 495-96 (1888).
214

Id. at 496.
Id. (capitalization and spelling modernized).

215

AN ESSAY UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ENGLISH PLANTATIONS ON THE CONTINENT OF

213

AMERICA 67-68 (London, 1701) (capitalization and spelling modernized).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss3/4

42

Shelfer: Intergovernmental Federalism Disputes

2018] INTERGOVERNMENTAL FEDERALISM DISPUTES 873

central government in order to prevent the colonies from erupting
2 16
into civil wars over boundaries.
On July 21, 1775, Benjamin Franklin submitted to Congress a
plan for union of the colonies. In his plan, Franklin gave Congress
the power of "settling all disputes and differences between colony
217
and colony about limits or any other cause if such should arise."
On July 12, 1776, John Dickinson presented Congress with his draft
of the Articles. His draft stated that "[t]he United States assembled
shall have the sole and exclusive Right and Power of... Settling all
Disputes and Differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may
arise between two or more Colonies concerning Boundaries,
21 8
Jurisdictions, or any other Cause whatever."
Congress took Dickinson's draft and produced an amended
version of the Articles of Confederation, which it adopted on
219
November 15, 1777, and distributed to the states for ratification.
Article IX greatly expanded the section regarding how disputes
between states were to be adjudicated, stating: "The united states
in congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all
disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise
between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any
other cause whatever." 220 Further, Article IX outlined a complex
dispute resolution process that has been called "an almost
incredibly clumsy system for arbitrating interstate border
disputes."221 Whenever an agent of a state petitioned Congress,
then Congress would notify the other state or states in the
controversy. 222 The parties were then "directed to appoint[,] by joint
consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing

216

1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 52 (Merrill

Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION] (stating that

some delegates "insisted that a central government was indispensible to... prevent civil war
among the colonies over lands and boundaries").
217 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 194-96 (Gov't Printing
Office 1905) (capitalization modernized); see also WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN:

AN AMERICAN LIFE 299-300 (2003) (discussing Franklin's plan).
218

1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 78-79, 82.

Id. at 78. The Articles of Confederation went into operation on February 2, 1781, when
Maryland became the final state to ratify it. Id. at 57.
220 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX, para. 2.
221 See Frank, supra note 121, at 8.
219

222

1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 90.
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and determining the matter in question."223 If the states were not
able to agree, then Congress would name three proposed judges
from each state, and the parties would alternate striking out the
names until they reached thirteen names, a process akin to
empaneling a special jury.224 The Articles also contained extensive
rules governing how the commission was to be named if either of the
225
states did not appear or did not participate.
The wording of Article IX caused some confusion. First, what
was meant by making the Congress the "last resort on appeal"? As
North Carolina delegate Thomas Burke wrote, this section was
"[b]adly worded, 'the united States shall be the last resort on appeal
in all disputes between the states.' I have no Idea of an appeal, or
last resort unless their be some prior Jurisdiction and prior resort,
and I know of no such thing between the States."226 Indeed, the
Articles of Confederation tribunals were not traditional judicial
227
courts, but rather were closer to ad hoc administrative panels.
Indeed, it was strange for colonies, let alone states, to resolve
their disputes in courts of law. As Charles Warren has argued, this
was "the first time in history" that there was "a judicial tribunal

223

Id.

Id. ("[I]f they cannot agree, congress shall name three persons out of each of the united
states, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the
petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number
not less than seven, nor more than nine names as congress shall direct, shall in the presence
of congress be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names shall be so drawn or any five
of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the
controversy ....). For a discussion of the "special jury" process, see Lochlan Shelfer, Note,
Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 213-20 (2013).
225 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 2 ("[I]f either party shall neglect to attend
at the day appointed, without showing reasons, which congress shall judge sufficient, or being
present shall refuse to strike, the congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of
each State, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or
refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed, in the manner before
prescribed, shall be final and conclusive ....).
226 Thomas Burke's Notes on the Articles of Confederation (Dec. 18, 1777), reprinted in 8
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 436 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1981)
(alteration in original).
224

227

See CHARLES GROVE HAINES & FOSTER H. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME

COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1835-1864, at 249 (1957) (stating that "[i]t

is evident that the courts envisioned by the Articles of Confederation were essentially factfinding bodies and, as such, were concerned less with questions of law than with questions of
fact, and that in organization and procedure they resembled only slightly the federal courts
established under Article III of the Constitution").
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with compulsory jurisdiction over sovereign States." 228 Warren
further noted "the people of those days had not become used to
regarding this tribunal as a Court,"229 quoting an article in Boston's
American Herald from 1785 describing the Article IX process as
"arbitration" conducted by "auditors."230 Robert Livingston called it
a "singular event," stating "[t]here are few instances of independent
states submitting their cause to a court of justice. ' 23 1 A Philadelphia
newspaper in 1783 called it "a new and extraordinary spectacle:
Two powerful and populous states ...submit[ting] to the
'232
arbitration of judges.
But the states that ratified the Articles recognized the
importance of Congress's power to resolve all inter-state disputes.
New Jersey, in its representation to Congress upon its ratification
of the Articles, wrote: "[t]he Boundaries and Limits of each State
ought to be fully and finally fixed and made known; this we
apprehend would be attended with very salutary Effects, by
preventing Jealousies as well as Controversies, and promoting
Harmony and Confidence among the States. 2 33
Article IX of the Articles only once settled a controversy, namely
the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania. 234 Five other
inter-state disputes also began the Article IX dispute resolution
235
procedure, all of which were territorial boundary disputes.
Nevertheless, when the delegates gathered in Pennsylvania in the

228 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 5 (1924).
229 Id. at 127 n.6.

Id.
Letter from Robert R. Livingston to La Fayette (Jan. 10, 1783), in 6 THE REVOLUTIONARY
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 201-02 (Francis Wharton ed.,
Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office 1889).
232See 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 506-07 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952) (quoting the
article in Philadelphia's Freeman's Journal,and discussing the possibility that Jefferson was
involved its writing).
233 New Jersey Representation
to Congress (June 15-16, 1778), reprinted in 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supranote 216, at 113, 115.
234 See PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787, at 6 (1983) ("Though Article IX
subsequently offered a procedure for settling conflicts, it was so complicated that only one
case, Connecticut v. Pennsylvania(1782), was ever resolved under its provision.").
235 These were New Hampshire v. Vermont, Pennsylvania v. Virginia, New Jersey v.
Virginia,Massachusettsv. New York, and South Carolinav. Georgia. See 131 U.S. app. 1-1xiii
230

231

(1888).
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Summer of 1787, all were in agreement that the new federal system
would have the same jurisdiction over inter-state disputes.
D. CONSTITUTION

When the Framers sought to improve upon the Articles of
Confederation in 1787, they also included the same jurisdiction over
At the Philadelphia
intergovernmental boundary disputes.
convention, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction went through
several iterations and did not assume its present state until late
August. Throughout the process, however, the convention delegates
were careful to lodge the power to adjudicate jurisdictional disputes
among the states and between a state and the United States in some
236
branch of the proposed government.
The drafters, however, struggled with where exactly to place the
power to decide intergovernmental disputes. On May 29, 1787,
Edmund Randolph presented the Virginia Plan. 23 7 The Virginia
Plan would have established a "National Judiciary," composed of
"one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be
chosen by the National Legislature." 238 The inferior tribunals would
"hear & determine in the first instance" and the supreme tribunal
would "hear and determine in the dernier resort" a series of cases,
including "questions which may involve the national peace and
harmony."23 9 The supreme tribunal would not have any original
jurisdiction under the Virginia Plan.240 On the same day, Charles
Pinckney proposed his plan, under which Congress would have
retained the power to regulate the adjudication of disputes between
the states, as under the Articles of Confederation. 241 William
236 Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787, at the opening of the constitutional convention,
outlined the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, including "that the federal
government could not check the quarr[e]ls between states." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
237 Id. at 18.
238 The Virginia Resolutions (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 244.
239 Id. at 244-45. The other cases within the national jurisdiction were to be "all piracies &
felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of
other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection
of the National revenue; [and] impeachments of any National officers." Id.
240 Id.
241 See Charles Pinckney's Plan (May 29, 1787), reprintedin 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 245-47 (reproducing James Wilson's notes regarding
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Paterson's New Jersey Plan, proposed on June 15, contained the
resolution "that provision ought to be made for hearing and deciding
upon all disputes arising between the United States and an
individual State respecting territory."242 On July 8, an anonymous
author wrote to George Washington and, for the first time,243
recommended that the national judiciary have jurisdiction over
"disputes [that] may arise between the different States," and that it
should "hear and determine all disputes and controversies arising
between different States, whether on account of territory, boundary,
'244
Jurisdiction or other Cause.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported to the convention
their draft constitution. 245 In the Committee of Detail's Draft, the
Senate was given jurisdiction over "all Disputes and
Controversies ...between two or more States respecting
jurisdiction or territory,"246 while the judiciary was given
jurisdiction over "Controversies between two or more States (except
The words
such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction). ' 24 7
"territory and jurisdiction" echoed the jurisdiction that the Articles
of Confederation had given to the Confederation Congress over "all
disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise
between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or
any other cause whatever. '' 248 Indeed, the procedure for interstate
jurisdictional disputes under this draft of the Constitution closely
249
resembled the Articles of Confederation procedure.
the Pinckney Plan, stating that it would have established Congress as "the last Resort on
Appeal in Disputes between two or more States"); 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 236, at
699 ("[Congress] shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding all
disputes & Controversies now subsisting or which may arise between the States respecting
Jurisdiction or Territory.").
242 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 236, at 611.
243 HAINES & SHERWOOD, supra note 227, at 250 ('"This proposal was probably the first
formulation of the idea that the Supreme Court should have authority and jurisdiction over
interstate controversies.").
244 Anonymous letter to George Washington (July 8, 1787), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870, at 229, 232

(1905).
245

1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supranote 216, at 260-69 (reproducing

the draft constitution).
246 Id. at 265.
247 Id. at 267.
248 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. IX,

para. 2.

249 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 260 ("The Committee

").
incorporated provisions from the Articles of Confederation ....
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The Senate's interstate dispute resolution procedure of Article IX
was not debated until August 24.250 According to James Madison's
notes, John Rutledge stated that the provision "was necessary
under the Confederation, but will be rendered unnecessary by the
national judiciary now to be established" and he moved to strike the
provision. 25 1 Hugh Williamson and Nathanial Ghorum argued that
the procedure would be preferable to resolution by the judiciary
because the judges might be partial to the parties. 25 2 Wilson "urged
the striking out, the judiciary being a better provision." 253 The
convention accordingly voted to strike the provision from the
Senate's jurisdiction, 254 and then dropped the exception of
"Territory or Jurisdiction" from the judiciary's grant of power.
Thus, whereas in the August 6 draft of the Constitution, the
Senate had jurisdiction over interstate disputes "respecting
jurisdiction or territory," while the judiciary was given jurisdiction
over interstate controversies "except such as shall regard Territory
or Jurisdiction," in the final Constitution, these exceptions were
dropped, and jurisdiction over all interstate controversies, both
territorial and subject-matter, were given to the judiciary. Under
the resulting Constitution, the federal judiciary had the same
jurisdiction as Congress had under the Articles of Confederation,
that is, jurisdiction over interstate disputes "concerning boundary,
255
jurisdiction or any other cause whatever."
Indeed, the structure of Article III of the Constitution 256 further
suggests that the term "controversies" is not limited to cases at law

250

See 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 470 (Jonathan Elliot

ed., Philadelphia, Pa., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891).
251 Id. at 471.
252 Id.
253

Id.

Id.
Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that the Constitution consciously excluded
from the Court's jurisdiction the Confederation Congress's jurisdiction "that extended to
virtually any dispute between states," and instead allowed only those state-party cases based
on "conventional common-law actions." Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 400. This
history of the document demonstrates, however, that the framers gave to the federal judiciary
power over all intergovernmental controversies, both of the common-law variety as well as
over territorial and jurisdictional disputes.
256 Article III, Section Two of the Constitution states in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equality, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
254

255
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and equity, but encompasses the sorts of intergovernmental
disputes heard by the King in Council. There are several theories
about the semantic distinction between "cases" and "controversies,"
most of which are not mutually exclusive. 25 7 One theory posits that
the word "cases" refers to civil and criminal matters, whereas the
word "controversies" refers only to civil matters. 258 Thus, the word
"'case" is broader than and comprehends the word "controversy."
But, as used in the Constitution, the limited category of "all Cases,
in Law and Equity" and "Cases" "of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" is narrower than the word "controversies," which, as
used in the Constitution, is limited only by the parties involved. The
Constitution limits the "Cases" to which federal courts have
jurisdiction to those that could have been heard in common-law,
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a
State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
257 Two of the most prominent, for instance, may both be correct. One theory is that, as St.
George Tucker argued in 1803, "cases" meant "all cases, whether civil or criminal," whereas
"[t]he word controversies, as here used, must be understood merely as relating to such as are
of a civil nature." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at app. 420-21; see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot be presumed that the
general word 'controversies' was intended to include any proceedings that relate to criminal
cases ....

"); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 536 n.2 (Boston, Mass., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing both St. George
Tucker's analysis of the word "controversies," as stated in Blackstone's Commentaries, and
Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm).
A second theory of the two words, put forth by Professor Akhil Amar, and suggested in
Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816), argues
that the Constitution's use of the word "all" before "cases" but not before "controversies"
means that Congress may limit federal jurisdiction over "controversies," but not over "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under" the Constitution and federal laws and treaties. See
Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206, 210-12 (1985).
Neither of these theories is necessarily inconsistent with the other, nor are they
inconsistent with the theory endorsed here, which is that the Constitution's textual
foundation for justiciability limitations is the terms limiting federal jurisdiction to "cases" "in
law and Equity" and "of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," limitations which are
conspicuously absent from "controversies."
158 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdictionin
State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 607 n.207 (1994) ("[I]t is possible to read the broader
term 'cases' as encompassing both cases and controversies without concluding that the
framers did not use the two terms to distinguish civil from criminal matters.").
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chancery, and admiralty or maritime courts. The Constitution
contains no such limitation for the "controversies" over which
federal courts have jurisdiction, limiting them only by party
This suggests that the term "controversy,"
configuration. 2 59
standing without limitation, is actually broader than the term
been justiciable
"Cases," extending to disputes that would not have
260
in a common-law, chancery, or admiralty court.
Indeed, this reading is supported by the various drafts of the
Charles
Constitution proffered during the summer of 1787.
Pinckney's plan would have given Congress "the exclusive power to
regulate the manner of deciding all disputes & Controversies now
subsisting or which may arise between the States respecting
Jurisdiction or Territory." 261 Similarly, the Committee of Detail's
August 6 draft of the Constitution gave the Senate jurisdiction over
"all Disputes and Controversies ...between two or more States
respecting jurisdiction or territory."262 These drafts suggest that the
terms "disputes" and "controversies" were both general terms that
could be used to refer to any disputes "between States respecting
jurisdiction or territory." This reading is supported by another
section of the August 6 draft, which gave the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over "controversies between two or more States (except
such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction)." 26 3 This language
further suggests that the term "controversies" on its own could be
F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies,and Diversity, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 79 n.151
(2014) ("Further supporting this understanding is that, unlike the 'arising under' provision,
the diversity provisions do not limit the judicial power to controversies 'in law or equity.' They
allow any type of suit-be it in law, equity, domestic relations, probate, or something elseto be heard in federal court.").
260 See id. at 78 (making this point and arguing that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
diversity cases so long as the state court would have jurisdiction to hear the case, even if the
controversy does not satisfy federal justiciability requirements).
Indeed, as a logical matter, the term "controversies" cannot be limited by the same
justiciability requirements that limit federal jurisdiction over federal question cases, which
are textually limited to suits "in Law or Equity" or "admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."
Otherwise, a state could end-run federal diversity jurisdiction by establishing causes of
actions that allow its citizens to sue out-of-state citizens without any federal justiciability
requirements; the out-of-state defendant would then not be able to remove to federal court,
because the federal court would determine that the suit does not satisfy federal justiciability
requirements (e.g., the plaintiff would not have standing sufficient to satisfy federal
standards), and would remand the controversy back to the state court.
261 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 236, at 599.
259

262

1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 216, at 265.

263

Id. at 267.
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interpreted to include interstate disputes over territory and
jurisdiction.
Thus, although it is commonly assumed that federal jurisdiction
extends only to suits that could have been brought in a judicial
common-law, chancery, or admiralty court at the time of the
Founding, 264 the history of the term "controversy" suggests that it is
actually more capacious than previously understood, and extends
even to cases that would not have been cognizable by traditional
courts, such as the intergovernmental disputes heard by the Privy
Council.
Nor did it escape the notice of the public that the judiciary would
have this ancillary jurisdiction over interstate governmental
disputes. Against the background of the Articles of Confederation,
there was the expectation that this jurisdiction would be lodged
somewhere in the federal government. 265 During the ratification
period, commentators both understood and accepted that the
264 On August 27, according to James Madison's notes, William Samuel Johnson moved to
insert the word "Constitution" before the word "laws" in Article XI, Section Three of the
August 6 draft constitution, 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 236, at 430 (Aug. 27, 1787)
(James Madison), which at that point read, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States," id. at
186 (Aug. 6, 1787) (James Madison). Madison objected and "doubted whether it was not going
too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the
Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature." Id. at 430
(Aug. 27, 1787) (James Madison). Madison further stated that "[t]he right of expounding the
Constitution in cases not of [a judiciary] nature ought not to be given to that Department."
Id. Johnson's motion, however, was ultimately agreed to unanimously, because, Madison
writes, it was "being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited
to cases of a Judiciary nature." Id. This later line is sometimes quoted as evidence that the
original understanding of federal jurisdiction was limited to "cases of a Judiciary nature," but
as can be seen from context, this statement referred only to constitutional federal-question
jurisdiction, which was limited to cases "at law or equity."
265 See, e.g., James Madison, Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), reprinted
in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1414 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION]
("[W]here two or more States are the parties, [federal jurisdiction] is not objected to. Provision
is made for this by the existing articles of Confederation; and there can be no impropriety in
referring such disputes to this tribunal" (footnote omitted)); Virginia Convention's Draft
Structural Amendments to the Constitution (June 27, 1788), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 265, at 1550 (providing the Virginia convention's
proposed amendments approving of federal jurisdiction over "controversies to which the
United States shall be a party" and "controversies between two or more States"); see also
Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article IlI, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1583
(1990) ("[O]ne jurisdiction that was particularly free from controversy was that in disputes
between two states.").
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266
judiciary would exercise this intergovernmental jurisdiction.
Even anti-federalist writers did not object, 26 7 acknowledging that
the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to determine the
demarcation that separated federal constitutional authority from
26S
state constitutional authority.
In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton justified federal
jurisdiction over "all those [causes] in which the United States are
a party," by stating: "Still less need be said in regard to [this] point.
Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can
only be properly referred to the national tribunals." 26 9 Regarding
"[t]he power of determining causes between two States," Hamilton

266 See, e.g., A Citizen of Philadelphia, The Weaknesses of Brutus Exposed (Nov. 8, 1787),
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 65-66
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983) (" 'Tis necessary in States ...that controversies should
have a just, speedy, and effectual decision ....If a controversy happens between two states,
must it continue undecided, and daily increase, and be more and more aggravated, by the
repeated insults and injuries of the contending parties, 'till they are ripe for the decision of
the sword? [O]r must the weaker states suffer, without remedy, the groundless demands and
oppressions of their stronger neighbours, because they have no avenger, or umpire of their
disputes? Or shall we institute a supreme power with full and effectual authority to contro[ ]I
the animosities, and decide the disputes of these strong contending bodies? In the one
proposed to us, we have perhaps every chance of a righteous judgment, that we have any
reason to hope for; but I am clearly of the opinion, that even a wrongful decision, would, in
most cases, be preferable to the continuance of such destructive controversies." (emphasis
omitted)).
267 See Candidus II (Dec. 20, 1787),
reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 493-94 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter

5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION] (supporting the creation of a "Supreme

Judicial Court" with jurisdiction over "controversies between two or more States"); Brutus
XIII (Feb. 21, 1788), reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE

CONSTITUTION 795-96 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) (supporting federal jurisdiction
over "controversies to which the United States are a party, and controversies between states,"
stating that it is properly "under the cognizance of the courts of the union, because none but
the general government, can, or ought to pass laws on their subjects"); see also The
Publication of Edmund Randolph's Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787),
reprintedin 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 260, 266

(John P. Kaminski et al., 1988) ("[T]he general government ought to be the supreme arbiter
for adjusting every contention among the states.").
268 As Samuel Osgood wrote to Samuel Adams on January 5, 1788, "[w]here the united
States are a Party against a State the supreme Judicial Court have expressly original
Jurisdiction-suppose then, any State should object to the exercise of Power by Congress as
infringing the Constitution of the State, the legal Remedy is to try to Question before the
supreme Judicial Court." The Supreme Court would then examine the Congressional Act
against the "general or State Constitutions." Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (January 5,
1788), reprintedin 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 267, at 618-

19.
269

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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explained that it was "not less essential to the peace of the Union
270
than that which has been just examined."
Thus, many readers of the draft Constitution understood it to
mean that federal courts, in particular the Supreme Court in its
original jurisdiction, would have jurisdiction to hear disputes
between states over territorial, jurisdictional, and other governing
disputes, and even to hear such disputes between a state and the
United States.
Indeed, in the years following the Constitution's ratification,
although few intergovernmental controversies came to the Supreme
Court, the Court's power to entertain such disputes was understood
and it was also understood that this jurisdiction extended beyond
determining territorial boundaries and also included adjudicating
competing intergovernmental claims of regulatory authority.
During the 1802 debate over the Judiciary Act, for instance,
Representative Samuel Dana from Connecticut argued for the
importance of an impartial judiciary, stating:
[There were] various restrictive provisions in the
Constitution, which appear framed to guard against
evils which might be apprehended from the change of
system. Restrictions were imposed on the powers of
Congress, and the respective States. Some of the
restrictions, undoubtedly, were to... guard the
particular States against the Government of the United
States, or against each other. Controversies were
known to exist between particular States, and others
might be expected to arise, as well as controversies
between a State and the United States.... When
provision was to be made for questions of this nature,
who could hesitate to acknowledge the importance of
establishing an impartial tribunal beyond the
immediate control of either party? A tribunal, the
constitution of which might inspire general confidence,
and thereby prevent the recourse to a very different
27 1
mode of deciding conflicting pretensions.

270

Id. at 402.

271

11 ANNALS OF CONG. 929 (1802).
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In 1809, Pennsylvania proposed the following amendment to the
Constitution: "To prevent the balance between the General and
State Governments from being destroyed, and the harmony of the
States from being interrupted,.., that an impartial tribunal may
be established to determine disputes between the General and State
Governments." 272 Virginia replied that "a tribunal is already
provided by the constitution of the United States, to wit, the
Supreme Court."273 North Carolina, too, was "satisfied that such a
'274
tribunal already exists.
Thus, from the Constitution's composition and ratification
through the Republic's first decades, there seemed to be an
understanding that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide
intergovernmental controversies regarding the distribution of
political jurisdiction, both regarding territory and regarding more
incorporeal objects.
IV. THE THEORY AND THE PRECEDENT

This Article has argued that the federal judiciary possesses a
unique grant of jurisdiction that lies outside traditional commonlaw, equity, or admiralty judicial power. It is the jurisdiction to
decide disputes between states or between a state and the United
States regarding governing interests. This jurisdiction, however,
like other jurisdictions, is not limitless. It has contours that can be
recognized by examining its antecedents. As this Article sought to
demonstrate in Part III, in such controversies, the governing
entities ask the arbitral authority to declare whether one of the
parties has exclusive regulatory control over the given domain.
Thus, the intergovernmental subject-matter boundary disputes that
were heard by the King in Council concerned requests for a
determination of whether a particular governing entity had
exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over a particular territory, people,
thing, or activity. This is the jurisdiction that this Article argues
was transferred from the Privy Council to the Confederation
Congress to, ultimately, federal courts, most notably the Supreme
Court in its original jurisdiction.
272
273
274

8 REG. DEB. 2899-2900.

Id. at 2903-04.
Id. at 2905.
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Indeed, although the history and contours of this jurisdiction
have hitherto been only dimly perceived, much of the Supreme
jurisdiction
to
hear
Court's
precedent concerning its
intergovernmental federalism disputes supports this Article's
theory. Although the Court's cases sometimes seem to conflict with
one another and sometimes contain misleading reasoning, their
holdings can be understood and reconciled by applying this Article's
theory that federal courts have jurisdiction over intergovernmental
assertions of exclusive regulatory authority. Indeed, the theory and
history put forth by this Article provide justification even for cases
that other theories have not discussed.
For instance, most theories of intergovernmental disputes do not
grapple with territorial boundary disputes, even though these
controversies most clearly distill the difficulty of such disputes. In
such cases, there are no governmental laws or acts at issue; the
Supreme Court does not require ripeness or forbid mootness, nor
does it require that there be any particular injury. Instead, a
government simply asks the Court to resolve the dispute over
respective claims of exclusive governing authority over a particular
territory.
This jurisdiction was first recognized in Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts,which held that the Court could exercise jurisdiction
over a boundary dispute between two states. 275 "[T]hough the
constitution does not, in terms, extend the judicial power to all
controversies between two or more states, yet it in terms excludes
none, whatever may be their nature or subject,"276 and "by no
obvious meaning or necessary implication, exclude[es] those which
relate to the title, boundary, jurisdiction, or sovereignty of a
2 77

state."

Chief Justice Taney dissented, stating that the Court can hear a
controversy regarding the boundaries of states only "where the suit
is brought to try a right of property in the soil, or any other right
which is properly the subject of judicial cognizance and decision, and
which depends upon the true boundary line."278 Taney relied on

275 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723-24 (1838).
276Id. at 721.

Id. at 723.
Id. at 752 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Taney further argues that the Court's
judicial powers "extend to those subjects, only, which are judicial in their character; and not
277
278
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279
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
in which the Cherokee Nation sued Georgia in the Court's original
jurisdiction, challenging Georgia state laws that claimed authority
28 0
over lands the Cherokee Nation governed under federal treaties.
Marshall held that the Court did not have original jurisdiction over
28 1
the case because the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state,"
but in dicta, the Chief Justice added that he was not convinced the
28 2
Court would have jurisdiction over this sort of claim at any rate.
But this controversy, Marshall stated, "savours too much of the
exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the
28 3
judicial department."

to those which are political.... Contests for rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction between
states over any particular territory, are not, in my judgment, the subjects of judicial
cognizance and control, to be recovered and enforced in an ordinary suit; and are, therefore,
not within the grant of judicial power contained in the constitution." Id. at 752-53 (Taney,
C.J., dissenting). See also Justice Taney's majority opinion in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210, 256-57 (1840), in which he states: "The case to be determined is one of
peculiar character, and altogether unknown in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. It
is a question of boundary between two sovereign states, litigated in a Court of justice; and we
have no precedents to guide us ......
279 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). For discussions of Cherokee Nation, see 4 ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 539-46 (1919); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 729-79 (1926); Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A

Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 514-16 (1969); Philip P. Frickey,
MarshallingPast and Present:Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and Interpretationin Federal
Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 390-406 (1993).
280 The Cherokee Nation asserted its exclusive authority to legislate over all matters within
this territory, noting its "exclusive right to their territory, and the exclusive right of self
government within that territory," and seeking "an injunction, to restrain the state of
Georgia... from executing and enforcing the laws of Georgia or any of these laws... within
the Cherokee territory, as designated by treaty between the United States and the Cherokee
nation." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2, 4.
281 Id.
at 18-20 ("We perceived plainly that the constitution in this article does not
comprehend Indian tribes in the general term 'foreign nations;' not we presume because a
tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States.").
282 Marshall stated that "[a] serious additional objection exists to the jurisdiction of the
court," inquiring whether "is the matter of the bill [is] the proper subject for judicial inquiry
and decision." Id. at 20. The Cherokee Nation asked the Court to determine its ability "to
exercise the usual powers of self government in their own country," but, Marshall stated, "this
court cannot interpose" on such matters. Id. It might be possible, Marshall went on, to decide
these questions "in a proper case with proper parties," i.e., in a traditional common-law case.
Id. Indeed, Marshall did decide the issue the following year, and in the Cherokee Nation's
favor, in a more typical common-law: an appeal from a Georgia state conviction. See
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562 (1832).
283 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. The other Justices agreed with Marshall on this
point. See id. at 28-29 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("I cannot entertain a doubt that [the claim]
is one of a political character altogether, and wholly unfit for the cognizance of a judicial
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Despite having sustained its jurisdiction to hear a territorial
boundary dispute in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, the Court
continued to be skeptical of cases asking a court to determine
competing claims of governing interests. This continued discomfort
would become most fully articulated in the 1867 case, Georgia v.
Stanton, in which Georgia sued Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to
enjoin the enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts, claiming that
they were meant "to overthrow and to annul this existing State
government, and to erect another and different government in its
place." 28 4 At oral argument, counsel for Georgia, Robert J. Walker,
argued that the settlement of intergovernmental federalism
disputes was the reason the Constitution gave the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over state-party cases. 28 5 The Supreme Court, however,

tribunal. There is no possible view of the subject, that I can perceive, in which a court of
justice can take jurisdiction of the questions made in the bill.... It is not a case of meum and
tuum in the judicial but in the political sense."); id. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("I
certainly, as before observed, do not claim, as belonging to the judiciary, the exercise of
political power ....
It is only where the rights of persons or property are involved, and when
such rights can be presented under some judicial form of proceedings, that courts of justice
can interpose relief. This court can have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the
constitutionality of a state law. Such law must be brought into actual or threatened
operation, upon rights properly falling under judicial cognizance, or a remedy is not to be had
here.").
284 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50, 52 (1867).
285 The GreatInjunction Cases: The State of Mississippi in the Supreme Court, N.Y. HERALD,
May 4, 1867, at 10 ("The mere settlement of matters involving land or money was not the
reason which induced the framers of the constitution to give this court original jurisdiction
in all cases where a State should be a party. That jurisdiction was granted to secure peace
and harmony.., not as to mere questions of title to a tract of land or a sum of money, but as
to all the great questions which involve the constitutionality of law of Congress, the
construction of the constitution, or the interpretation of treaties .... Among the rights
reserved to each State [in the Constitution] was the right to come into this court and ask its
decision, [as] the ultimate arbiter .... The case of the controversy between the States of
Rhode Island and Massachusetts was perfectly decisive on the question of jurisdiction. That
case did not involve the title to an acre of land, nor a dollar of money .... That was a cause
of disputed sovereignty and jurisdiction over five thousand people, and the court entertained
jurisdiction ... ").
This was the same argument advanced a week earlier by George Ticknor Curtis, the
lawyer who had served as Dred Scott's counsel before the Supreme Court, in which case his
brother, Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis, famously dissented. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting). George Ticknor Curtis argued that
the Supreme Court was "the only judicial tribunal that a State can enter for the protection of
its rights as a member of the Union." AM. CITIZEN, May 11, 1867. He further argued that
the Court's "judicial power of our government was intended to embrace a function that does
not ordinarily belong to that department in other governments." Id. Curtis argued that the
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rejected this argument, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to
The Court
hear a dispute raising a "political question." 28 6
distinguished Rhode Island v. Massachusetts as concerning-not
governing interests claims-but conventional property claims,
because the state may take ownership of the land in the event of
escheat, and "that sovereignty and jurisdiction were but
incidental."' 28 7 The Court accordingly dismissed Georgia's bill for
want of jurisdiction. 28 8 As Professor David Currie has noted,
however, this is a dubious reading of Rhode Island, which "never
referred to the state's property interest."28 9 Moreover, as Chief
Justice Taney noted, governing interests of the sort at issue in
intergovernmental boundary disputes are entirely unlike property
interests.290
By "political question," the Court did not envision the Baker v.
Carr definition that considers non-justiciable any "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department." 291 Instead, the Court meant that
the case did not present a common-law injury, but rather raised
competing claims of political jurisdiction between the state and
292
federal governments.

Court can decide the "question of jurisdiction between the United States and the individual
states," and that it should exercise that jurisdiction to hear Georgia's claim. Id.
286 Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77.
287 Id. at 73 ("The right of property was undoubtedly involved; as in this country, where
feudal tenures are abolished, in cases of escheat; the State takes the place of the feudal lord,
by virtue of its sovereignty, as the original and ultimate proprietor of all the lands within its
jurisdiction."); see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 415-16 & n.99 (discussing the
Stanton court's interpretation of Rhode Island).
288 Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 78.
289 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction,
1863-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 153 n.120 (1984).
290 See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 753 (1838) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Sovereignty and jurisdiction are not matters of property; for the allegiance in
the disputed territory cannot be a matter of property. Rhode Island, therefore, sues for
political rights.").
291 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Currie, supra note 289, at 154 ("Thus, despite
its misleading terminology, Stanton seems to have held not that Reconstruction was a
").
political issue but ... that the state had no standing to assert merely political interests ....
292 Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 76-77 ("[Tjhe rights in danger... must be rights of persons
or property, not merely political rights, which do not belong to the jurisdiction of a court,
either in law or equity."); see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 11, at 418 ("It was the lack
of a common-law injury, rather than the nature of the issues underlying the legality of the
defendants' conduct, that led to the finding of nonjusticiability [in Stanton].").
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As this Article has argued, Stanton's reasoning is incorrect.
First, as discussed above, its attempt to distinguish territorial
boundary disputes is unpersuasive. Second, Georgia had sought the
Court's review of the very issue that lies at the core of the historical
jurisdiction over intergovernmental federalism disputes: whether it
had the exclusive authority to govern its own internal affairs, and
whether the Reconstruction Acts invaded the exclusive governing
province of the state. In this, it is indistinguishable from Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, as both suits asked the Court to determine
which government had exclusive regulatory authority over the
internal affairs of a particular territory. Indeed, more recently
Justices and scholars have criticized Stanton's reasoning and
293
argued that it should be overturned.
The Court did not consider the jurisdictional question again for
more than sixty years, and when it did, it did not cite Stanton at all,
instead concluding without difficulty that it had jurisdiction. In
Missouri v. Holland, the Court held that it had jurisdiction over
Missouri's suit to prevent enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty

293 See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 246 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The] question [in
Stanton] was no more 'political' than a host of others we have entertained." (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), among others)); see also
Crocker, supra note 13, at 2061-64 (describing the modern scholarly and judicial rejection of
Stanton).
Nevertheless, Georgia v. Stanton's outcome was correct for a different reason. To
exercise state-party-based original jurisdiction over the case, the Court would have had to
determine whether the plaintiff actually constituted the State of Georgia. This was indeed a
"political question," not as the Stanton Court understood that term, but as we understand
that term today: it was a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Determining which governing
entity constituted the state of Georgia was a question committed to Congress. See Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) ("[Under t]he fourth section of the fourth article of the
Constitution of the United States[,] [that is, the Republican Guarantee Clause]. . . . it rests
with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State ... [a]nd its
decision is binding on every other department of the government .... ").
At the time that Georgia brought its suit, Congress had refused to recognize as the
legitimate government of Georgia the very Georgian officials who had authorized the suit and
who now appeared before the Court. See Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 50-52 (describing the
Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, 14 Stat. 428 (1867),
and Georgia's arguments therewith). The Court could not review this congressional decision.
Defense counsel alluded to this argument before the Court, see id. at 61-62 (citing Luther v.
Borden and arguing that, "Congress and the President must decide" whether the prior state
government or the congressionally-established state government "is the rightful State; and
when they decide it, it is decided for this court and for all; for that is the only tribunal that
can decide it"), but the Court did not discuss it.
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Act on the ground that "the statute is an unconstitutional
interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment." 294 Although the state had also alleged a proprietary
interest "as owner of the wild birds within its borders and
otherwise," the Court held that that claim was unnecessary for it to
assert jurisdiction. 295 Similarly in Colorado v. Toll, the Court held
that it had jurisdiction over Colorado's suit to enjoin a federal
regulation of a national park and have it declared unconstitutional
as "interfer[ing] with the sovereign rights of the State. 296
These terse decisions seem to contradict the reasoning of
Stanton.29 7 Both Holland and Toll, however, can be understood
using the historical model outlined in Part III. What was necessary
for the Court to hear these cases was that a state claimed that its
exclusive regulatory domain had been intruded upon by the federal
government.
In tension with Holland and Toll, however, is the language of
three cases from the same period: Massachusetts v. Mellon,298 New
Jersey v. Sargent,299 and Texas v. ICC.300 Each cites Stanton, stating
that intergovernmental disputes over which Congress has exclusive
authority to regulate a particular object are not justiciable. The
underlying reasoning of the cases, however, belies their true basis.
Each case addresses the merits of the state's constitutional claims
and denies them only after finding that they fail on the merits.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, Massachusetts challenged the
constitutionality of the Maternity Act, which provided federal funds
to states that agreed to comply with its provisions, claiming that the
252 U.S. 416, 430-31 (1920) ("[T]he acts of the defendant done and threatened under
that authority invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will manifested in
statutes.").
295 Id. at 431 ("[fIt is enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the
alleged quasisovereign rights of a State.").
296 268 U.S. 228, 229-30 (1925). Colorado argued that the regulation, which banned
chauffeuring within the park, "assert[ed] full authority over all highways in the park to the
exclusion of the State," but "the State never has ceded its power." Id. Colorado therefore
sought to have the regulation struck down as "derogat[ing]" and "infring[ing]" upon
Colorado's authority over its highways. Id.
297 See Edward S. Corwin, ConstitutionalLaw in 1919-1920, 15 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 5455 n.52 (1921) (arguing that Missouri v. Holland"seems to leave very little of the doctrine of
'political questions' as applied in [Stanton]").
298 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
294

299 269 U.S. 328 (1926).
300 258 U.S. 158 (1922).
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Act was "an attempted exercise of the power of local self-government
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment." 30 1 The Court first
found that Massachusetts's claim was not a controversy between
government regarding exclusive authority over an activity, the
exact sort of intergovernmental federalism dispute that this Article
has outlined: "Probably, it would be sufficient to point out that the
powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no
obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to
accept or reject." 30 2 The Court then went on to state that it lacked
the jurisdiction to consider the claim because the Court was "called
upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property ...but abstract
questions of political power, of sovereignty, of government. ' 30 3 The
Mellon Court's conclusion can be rationalized by the theory
presented in this Article. The Court held that the state's claim did
not actually present a dispute over the exclusive regulatory
authority of a certain domain. Instead, Massachusetts claimed that
the federal government intruded on the state's domain by offering
it federal funds. 30 4 This claim does not fit the historical model of a
claim of exclusive governmental power, and the Court properly
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In New Jersey v. Sargent, similarly, New Jersey presented a bill
to the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction, seeking to obtain
a declaratory judgment that Congress exceeded its authority and
encroached on that of the State in passing the Federal Water Power
Act insofar as that statute related to waters "within or bordering on
that State."30 5 The Court dismissed the bill, stating that it lacked
jurisdiction. 30 6 The Court, however, still held on the merits that
Congress does have absolute constitutional authority over all
navigable waters within the United States. 30 7 In other words, the
301262 U.S. at 479.
302 Id. at 480.
303 Id. at 484-85.

Id. at 479.
269 U.S. 328, 330, 334 (1926).
306 Id. at 337 ("Plainly these allegations do not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of
judicial power.").
307 Id. ("[T]he power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, which the Constitution
vests in Congress, includes the power to control, for the purposes of such commerce, all
navigable waters which are accessible to it and within the United States, whether within or
without the limits of a State, and to that end to adopt all appropriate measures to free such
waters from obstructions to navigation and to preserve and even enlarge their navigable
304
305
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Court dismissed New Jersey's bill because New Jersey lost on the
merits. New Jersey had asked the Court "an abstract question
respecting the relative authority of Congress and the State in
dealing with [interstate] waters," 30 8 and ultimately that is exactly
what New Jersey received: a declaration that adjudicated New
Jersey's claim. The Court, therefore, declared that Congress has
exclusive and plenary authority of all navigable waters of the
United States, thus resolving the intergovernmental federalism
dispute.
In Texas v. ICC, Texas sought a declaration that the
Transportation Act of 1920 unconstitutionally regulated intrastate
commerce. 309 The Court dismissed the bill, suggesting that it did
not have jurisdiction to reach the merits. 310 Nevertheless, the Court
did adjudicate the merits of Texas's constitutional challenge,
concluding in detail how the Act affected only interstate
commerce, 3 11 and noting that the Act had already been upheld
against the same attack in a previous case, 3 12 Railroad Commission
of Wisconsin, which had held that, "incidental [intrastate]
regulation is not an invasion of state authority."3 13 Thus, although
the Court spoke as if it did not have jurisdiction to hear Texas's
request for a determination of the exclusive regulatory boundaries

capacity; and that the authority and rights of a State in respect of such waters within its
limits, and in respect of the lands under them, are subordinate to this power of Congress.").
308 Id. at 330.
309 258 U.S. 158, 159 (1922); see Motion to File Original Bill and Original Bill and Exhibits
at 6, Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S 158 (1922) ("[T]he Constitution of the United States does not
delegate to the national government any power ... with respect to the internal affairs and
but [those powers] are specially reserved to"
intrastate commerce of the State of Texas ....
Texas).
310 Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. at 162 (stating that Texas's claim was "an abstract question of
legislative power .... Obviously, this part of the bill does not present a case or controversy
within the range of the judicial power as defined by the Constitution. It is only where rights,
in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected
prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in
question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of the judicial power." (citing Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 73 (1867))).
311 Id. at 160-62 ("The provisions of Titles III and IV [of the Act] which are drawn in
question are all in terms confined to matters pertaining to railroad carriers engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, and evidently were enacted in what Congress regarded as an
exercise of its power to regulate such commerce.").
312 Id. at 165 (citing R.R. Comm'n of Wis. v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 257 U.S.
563 (1922)).
313 257 U.S. at 588.
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separating Texas from the federal government, that is exactly what
the Court did, declaring that the Transportation Act did not exceed
Congress's power and did not infringe upon the state's exclusive
domain.
Thus, in the 1920s, the Court on several occasions stated that it
would not have jurisdiction to decide abstract questions of political
power. And yet in each of these cases, the Court resolved on the
merits the question that this Article has argued comprises the
special grant of jurisdiction over intergovernmental federalism
disputes: the Court's power to draw the boundary between two
regulatory authorities, adjudicating which one has exclusive
authority over a particular regulatory object.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court has
exercised jurisdiction over a number of cases without discussing
jurisdiction at all. For instance, in South Carolinav. Katzenbach,
South Carolina argued that Congress intruded onto South
Carolina's exclusive powers by regulating elections in the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.314 At conference, the Justices were split
regarding jurisdiction, 315 and when the Court granted South
Carolina leave to file, Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart
dissented.3 16 On the merits, the Court rejected out of hand South
Carolina's claims that the Voting Rights Act violated the Fifth
Amendment and the Bill of Attainder Clause, because those
provisions do not protect states, 3 17 addressing only the claim that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment and
thereby intruded onto the regulatory domain of the states. 318 This
holding makes sense under this Article's theory. The case was an
intergovernmental federalism dispute asking the Court to
314 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966), abrogatedby Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S,Ct. 2612 (2013); see
Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 13, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
(No. 22), 1965 WL 115334, at *13 (claiming that the Voting Rights Act "unconstitutionally
and unlawfully invades, restricts and abrogates the exclusive rights" of South Carolina "to
regulate and prescribe reasonable qualifications for its residents to vote").
315 Justice Black had doubts regarding "the declaratory judgment route," thinking that it
might "come close to an advisory opinion." THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985)
830 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). Justice Harlan wanted to have oral argument over whether to
grant leave to file, but the Chief Justice opposed this, stating that "[tihere is no question as
to our jurisdiction." Id. at 831.
316 See id.; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898 (1965) (mem.).

317 383 U.S. at 323-24.
318 Id. at 324.
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determine which government had the exclusive authority to
regulate elections. Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Bill of
Attainder Clause claims presented the sort of controversy that this
Article has shown is a valid intergovernmental federalism dispute,
thus explaining the Court's summary rejection of those claims.
Oregon v. Mitchell,319 decided five years after Katzenbach,
involved the similar claim that the Voting Rights Act of 1970, by
setting the age of suffrage at eighteen, invaded the states' exclusive
regulatory authority over minimum voter age. 320 The Court decided
the merits of the case without discussing jurisdiction, 321 and
declared that Congress has the exclusive authority to set the
minimum voting age for federal elections, while states have the
exclusive authority to set them for state and local elections. 322 Once
again, the Court exercised jurisdiction to answer a disputed
question between two governments regarding which had exclusive
regulatory power over a particular domain.
Similarly, in South Carolina v. Regan, South Carolina sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against an Internal Revenue Code
323
provision that withheld a tax exemption from state bearer bonds.
South Carolina argued that the provision "isconstitutionally invalid
as violative of the Tenth Amendment and the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity." 324 Essentially, South Carolina
was arguing that, under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity, the state, not Congress, had exclusive jurisdiction to tax
interest earned on state obligations, 325 and thus the Court exercised
326
jurisdiction over the suit.

319 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Oregon v. Mitchell was a consolidation of four motions for leave to
file: No. 43, Orig., Oregon v. Mitchell; No. 44, Orig., Texas v. Mitchell; No. 46, Orig., United
States v. Arizona; and No. 47, Orig., United States v. Idaho. Id. at 117 n.i.
320 See, e.g., Texas v. Mitchell, Brief on Motion for Leave To File Complaint, at 3 (claiming
that Congress "has exceeded its constitutional powers and thereby usurped powers reposed
in the states, present[ing] conflicting claims of governmental powers with regard to the same
subject matter").
321 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117 n.1 (opinion of Black, J.) ("No question has been
raised concerning the standing of the parties or the jurisdiction of this Court.").
322 Id. at 117-18.
323 465 U.S. 367, 367 (1984).
324 Id. at 370.
325 Id. at 372 ("South Carolina argues that Congress may not tax the interest earned on the
obligations of a State.").
326 Id. at 370.
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In South Dakota v. Dole, South Dakota filed a declaratory
judgment action challenging a federal law that withheld federal
highway funds from states that allowed anyone under the age of
twenty-one to purchase alcohol.3 27 South Dakota claimed that the
law infringed on the state's exclusive prerogative to regulate alcohol
under the Twenty-First Amendment. 328 Citing Mellon, the Court
concluded that Congress does not intrude upon states' regulatory
authority when it places conditions on federal grants.3 2 9 And as
with Mellon,330 the Court exercised jurisdiction to hear a request for
declaratory judgment determining whether a spending decision by
Congress intruded upon the states' exclusive regulatory
33 1
jurisdiction.
The Court also exercised jurisdiction in New York v. United
States, in which New York asked the Court to declare
unconstitutional a federal statute that required New York either to
take title to radioactive waste or to pass a particular law. 332 The
United States did not contest jurisdiction at any level, and the Court
never discussed justiciability. Instead, the Court decided on the
merits New York's claim that Congress had exceeded its own
authority and intruded onto New York's exclusive domain. The
Court held that the United States cannot commandeer a state's
exclusive privilege over taking title to something or passing a
333
particular law.
More recently, in Arizona v. United States,334 the United States
sued Arizona to challenge an Arizona immigration law, S.B. 1070,
seeking a declaratory judgment that it was an "impermissible
encroachment into an area of exclusive federal authority" and was

327

483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).

328

Id.

Id. at 210 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).
330 See supra pp. 60-61 (arguing that "the [Mellon] Court properly considered the claim on
the merits," despite claiming it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim).
331 Id. at 205.
Indeed, in Floridaex rel. Attorney General v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the United States did
not even contest Florida's standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act's grant of power to
the HHS Secretary to penalize states that declined to participate in expanding Medicare.
332 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
333 Id. at 175-76.
334 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
329
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preempted by federal regulation and policies. 335 Neither the district
court, the Ninth Circuit, nor the Supreme Court ever mentioned
jurisdiction but simply issued the declaration that Congress has
exclusive control over alien removal and has occupied the field, and
that Arizona's law infringes onto this exclusive regulatory
3 36
domain.
Thus, the cases that the Supreme Court has decided accord well
with this Article's theory that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to hear intergovernmental federalism disputes that ask the Court
to determine which governmental entity has exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction over a particular domain.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has offered an historical investigation into federal
courts' jurisdiction over intergovernmental federalism disputes. It
has argued that federal courts do in fact have a historically
legitimate power to cognize a certain subset of those cases: claims
of exclusive regulatory authority brought by one government
against another.

335 First Amended Complaint at 6, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
336 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 402-10.
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